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L Introduction
Imagine that you are writing a thesis concerning media coverage ofpoli-
tics in the Middle East. You log onto the Internet and find numerous useful
articles concerning the recent election in Israel on the web site of the New
York Times. Deciding that these articles would be helpful, you print them out.
Then, in the course of writing your thesis, you use the articles as evidence of
bias in the media. Later, your thesis is published in a scholarly journal, and
you win numerous accolades. However, a month later, you are served with a
summons and complaint. The plaintiff, the New York Times, alleges breach
of contract for your use of its articles. When, you ask, did I enter into a con-
tract with the New York Times?
This scenario is not as farfetched as it may seem. Many of the most
popular web sites today are informational sites, such as those operated by the
Washington Post, the New York Times, the Chicago Tribune, CNN, ESPN, and
other information providers. These web sites contain traps for the unwary:
online user agreements, otherwise known as terms and conditions of use, that
supposedly are binding on the web site user and that contain copyright provi-
sions that are more restrictive than federal copyright law. Although several
scholars have addressed the numerous contractual problems that arise from
Internet use,' and others have addressed the impact of the Internet on federal
1. See Gerald J. Ferguson & Oliver J. Armas, Enforcing Electronic Cdntracts in the
Americas, 13-AUT INT'LL. PRACIICUM 94 (2000) (addressing law concerning creation of elec-
tronic contracts and emphasizing potential international character of such contracts); William
W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CH.-KENT L. REV. 1203 (1998) (argu-
ing that intellectual property owners will soon rely less on intellectual property law and more on
contract rights and technological protection to charge consumers to access online information).
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copyright law,2 none have addressed the interrelated questions ofwhether these
user agreements are enforceable contracts and whether the copyright pro-
visions contained therein are enforceable under federal copyright law. This
Note fills that void.
A. Factual Background: Hidden Terms and Conditions?
Numerous web sites provide free information and news to anyone who
has access to the Internet. To protect the content of their web sites, the web
site owners typically attach terms and conditions of use to their sites.3 The
user can view these terms and conditions by "clicking" on a link usually
located at the bottom of the web site's home, or main, page.' For example, at
the bottom of the Washingtonpost.com's home page, there is a link titled
"Member Agreement and Privacy Policy" and another titled "Copyright."
5
Similarly, the home page of ESPN.com contains a link titled "Terms of Use"
at the bottom of the page." These links are underlined and their text usually
appears in a contrasting color to signify that the user can "click" on them to
access the terms and agreements
2. See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact ofAutomated Rights
Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. RPv. 557, 560 (1998) (explaining
that automated rights management, as method to track and monitor exchange of information on
Internet, "enables information providers to enforce standard copyright claims mechanically,
without resort to litigation" by charging fees for information exchanges); Edmund W. Kitch,
Can The Internet ShrinkFair Use?, 78 NEB. L. REv. 880 (1999) (exploring idea that Internet
will cause scope of permitted fair use of copyrighted work to shrink); Daniel Ovanezian, Com-
ment, InternetSearch Engine Copying: Fair Use Defense to CopyrightInfringement, 14 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTiR & HIGH TEC. L.i. 267 (1998) (addressing idea that Internet search engine
companies, when they catalogue web sites in order to provide access to Internet users, may be
committing copyright infringement against owners of web sites that are so catalogued).
3. See, e.g., TheNew York Times on the Web SubscriberAgreement, available athttp'/
www.nytimes.com/-mfo/help/agree.html (last visited Sept. 19,2001) (setting forth web site terms
of use); The Chicago Tribune Copyright and Terms of Service, available at http'//www.chicago
tribune.com/services/site/chi-copyrighthtnlstory (last visited Sept 19, 2001) (listing terms of
service); CNN.com Interactive Service Agreement, available at http'i/www.cnn.comfmter-
activelegal.html (last visited Sept 19, 2001) (setting forth web site's user agreement).
4. See infra notes 5-7 and accompanying text (discussing process by which user can
view terms and conditions).
5. Washingtonpostcom, available at http'/www.washingtonpostcom (last visited Sept.
23,2001).
6. ESPN.com, available at http'//espn.go.com (last visited Sept 23,2001).
7. ESPN.com's Terms of Use link is simply underlined to signify that it is a link to more
text. ESPN.com, available at http'/espngo.com (last visited Sept 23, 2001). The Washing-
tonpostcom's Member Agreement and Privacy Policy link and its Copyright link are both
underlined and highlighted in blue text. Washingtonpostcom, available at http://www.wash-
ingtonpostcom (last visited Feb. 8, 2001). CNN.com's Terms link is also underlined and
written in blue. CNN.com, available athttp://www.nn.com (last visited Sept 19,2001).
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Should a user decide to click on one of these links, that user will encounter
language explaining that, by using the site, the user is bound to the terms and
conditions of that site. For example, the New York Times on the Web states
that, "[i]f you choose to use the NYT Web service... you will be agreeing to
abide by all ofthe terms and conditions ofthis Agreement between you and the
New York Times on the Web."' The other sites contain similar language.9
Within these web site terms and conditions are various copyright provi-
sions.10 For example, the Washingtonpost.com's site contains a copyright
notice that states as follows:
You may not copy, reproduce, distribute, publish, display, perform, mod-
ify, create derivative works, transmit, orin anyway exploit any part of this
service, except that you may download material from this service for your
own personal, noncommercial use as follows: you may make one machine
readable copy and/or one print copy that is limited to occasional articles of
personal interest only."
Similarly, the New York Times Copyright Notice says "you may download
material from the New York Times on the Web (one machine readable copy
and one print copy per page) for your personal, noncommercial use only."12
Other sites contain similar language.' 3
8. The New York Times on the Web Subscriber Agreement, available athttp'Jlwww.
nytimes.com/info/help/agree.html (last visited Feb. 8,2001).
9. See CNN.com Interactive Service Agreement available at http://www.cnn.com/
interactive-legal.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2001) (stating that "[b]y using CNN Interactive
(other than to read this agreement for the first time), Subscriber agrees to comply with all the
terms and conditions hereof"); ESPN.com Terms of Service, available at http'J/espn.go.com/
sitetools/s/terms.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2001) (stipulating that "ESPN.com provides its
service to you, subject to the following Terms of Service ("TOS"), which may be updated by
us from time to time without notice to you"); Washingtonpostcom UserAgreement and Privacy
Policy, available at http'/www.washingtonposteom/wp-srvmteraet/longterm/talkmembers.
htm (last visited Sept. 19,2001) (stating that "[b]y using this Service, you agree to be bound by
the terms of this Agreement and by the Service Discussion Guidelines").
10. See infra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (describing copyright provisions on
informational web sites).
11. Washingtonpost.com CopyrightNotice, available athttp'//www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-srvfinteract/longterm/tlkfcopy.htm (last visited Sept 21,2001).
12. The New York Times Copyright Notice, available at http'J/www.nyimes.omlmfo/
help/copyright.html (last visited Sept 19, 2001).
13. See The Chicago Tribune Copyright and terms of service, available athttp'/www.
chicagotribune.com/services/sit/chi-copyright/htmlstory (last visited Feb. 8, 2001). ("You may
use the content online and solely for your personal, non-commercial use, and you may down-
load or print a single copy of any portion of the Content for your personal, non-commercial
use. . . ."); CNN Interactive Service Agreement, available at http'//www.cnn.com/interactive-
legal.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2001) (stating that material on CNN's websitc is copyrighted
and that "[s]ubscriber may not modify, publish, transmit, participate in the transfer or sale, cre-
1628
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B. Legal Issues Raised
The first legal question raised by these web sites is whether the terms and
conditions are enforceable agreements. The terms are not negotiated, and
most users probably do not read them. Therefore, the question is whether the
user has manifested assent to the terms. Further, a court may struggle to find
consideration for the agreement because the web sites do not charge fees to
access their sites. Although no case has specifically addressed the enforce-
ability of these terms and conditions, it is possible to analogize to other types
of contract cases. For example, in a class of cases commonly called "click-
wrap" cases, the user of a web site clicks on "I agree" to manifest assent to the
terms of the web site. 4 A second class of cases involves so-called "shrink-
wrap" contracts, in which courts have held that terms of a contract enclosed
in packaging are binding on a buyer once the buyer opens the package.'
Finally, a third class of cases involves what are called "browsewrap" con-
tracts, in which contract terms are actually part of a web site, and the user
supposedly assents to those terms merely by viewing the web site6 These
three types of cases are distinguishable from the informational web site agree-
ments, but they do suggest that courts are willing to find binding contracts
under non-traditional circumstances.
If the agreements are enforceable, the second legal issue is whether the
restrictive copyright provisions are valid under federal copyright law. Federal
copyright law provides a broad defense to copyright infringement actions
known as the fair use doctrine.' This doctrine allows a wider variety of uses
of copyrighted material than the copyright provisions contained in informa-
tional web sites. For example, under the fair use doctrine, a teacher should be
allowed to make multiple copies of a news article provided by Washington-
post.com and distribute the copies to her students.1 However, the copyright
notice forbids her from doing so.'9 Thus, these Internet conditions are in
direct conflict with the federal fair use doctrine. The Copyright Act addresses
ate derivative works, or in any way exploit, any of the content, in whole or in part," but that
"[s]ubscriber may download copyrighted material for Subscriber's personal use only").
14. See infra Part LB.1 (discussing clickwrap cases).
15. See infra Part ILB.2 (discussing shfinkwrap cases).
16. See infra Part ILB.3 (discussing browsewrap cases).
17. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) ("[The fair use ofa copyrighted work, including such use
by reproduction in copies... for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement
of copyright").
18. See id. ("including multiple copies for classroom use").
19. See Washingtonpostcom Copyright Notice, available at http'//www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-srv/interact/longterm/talk/copy.htm (last visited Sept 19, 2001) (explaining that user
"may make one machine readable copy and/or one print copy that is limited to occasional
articles ofpersonal interest only") (emphasis added).
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such a conflict in 17 U.S.C. § 301.20 Under this section, federal copyright
law - and the fair use doctrine- may or may not preempt the state law Internet
contracts and the copyright provisions contained therein.2
Although these two questions could be treated separately, they seem
inextricably and inevitably intertwined. Therefore, it is proper to address
them both in this Note. Part 11 of this Note will first discuss the contractual
requirements of mutual assent and consideration and then will analyze the
impact of clickwrap, shrinkwrap, and browsewrap cases on the validity of on-
line user agreements. Part M of this Note will begin to address federal copy-
right law; specifically, Part m will analyze the fair use defense and the four
statutory fair use factors. Then, in Part IV, this Note will discuss federal
preemption of state law contract claims. In a case involving the fair use of
Internet sites, preemption is warranted. Finally, Part V will tie the preceding
subjects together and conclude that the copyright provisions of the online user
agreements are unenforceable.
H1 Contractual Issues
In order to decide whether web site user agreements are valid contracts,
it is first necessary to determine whether such agreements satisfy the contrac-
tual requirements ofimutual assent and exchange of consideration. The recent
clickwrap cases, shinkwrap cases, and browsewrap cases provide useful anal-
ogies, and they must be discussed as well. However, because the clickwrap
and shrinkwrap cases are distinguishable from cases involving online user
agreements and because there is a split of authority regarding the browsewrap
cases, these cases do not necessarily answer the ultimate question of the
enforceability of online user agreements.
A. Traditional Contract Law Principles
1. Mutual Assent and Noticeability of Terms
Web site user agreements and copyright notices raise the question of
whether the traditional contractual requirement of mutual assent has been met.
Mutual assent is a prerequisite to an enforceable contract, that is, each party
20. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994) (stipulating that federal copyright law preempts equiva-
lent state rights in copyrighted work). Section 301 provides as follows:
[A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of au-
thorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the
subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103 ... are governed
exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or
equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State.
Id.
21. See infra Part IV (discussing federal preemption of state causes of action).
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must manifest its assent to the terms of a contract before such contract is
valid.' Manifestation of assent may be accomplished by either conduct or a
promise.' A party's objective manifestations, not its subjective intentions,
are usually the determining factors in assessing whether mutual assent exists. 4
In other words, when a party has extended an offer, the offeree's objective
acts concerning that offer may constitute acceptance of the offer.' Courts
have held that "when an offeree accepts the offeror's services without express-
ing any objection to the offer's essential terms, the offeree has manifested
assent to those terms."'  Following this rule, it would seem that an Internet
user's objective act of visiting the web site constitutes a manifestation of
assent to the terms, conditions, and copyright notices of that web site.
However, a party's objective act is insufficient to constitute assent unless
that party has notice that the act may cause the other party to infer assentY
Thus, the location and nature ofthe links to the online terms raise the question
of whether there is adequate notice. As one commentator stated, "[e]nforce-
ability is still likely to depend in large part on whether the ... agreement is
effectively brought to the attention of users. ''rs Courts will not enforce a con-
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (1981) (stating that "the forma-
tion of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent").
23. See id. § 18 (stating that "[m]anifestation of mutual assent to an exchange requires that
each party either make a promise or begin or render a performance").
24. See McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 820 P.2d 986, 990 (Wyo. 1991) (ex-
plaining that defendant's "subjective 'intent' to contract is irrelevant, if [defendant's] inten-
tional, objective manifestations to [plaintiff] indicated assent to a contractual relationship");
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 ("Neither real nor apparent intention that a
promise be legally binding is essential to the formation of a contract. .. ").
25. See Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 608A.2d280,284 (N.J. 1992) (stating that"offeree
may manifest assent to the terms of an offer... by conduct, creating a contract implied-in-fact").
26. Graziano v. Grant, 741 A.2d 156,162 (N.J. Super. 1999) (quoting Weichert, 608 A.2d
at 285). The Weichert court also explained that "where an offeree gives no indication that he
or she objects to any of the offer's essential terms, and passively accepts the benefits of an
offeror's performance, the offeree has impliedly manifested his or her unconditional assent to
the terms of the offer." Weichert, 608 A.2d at 285.
27. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19(2) ("The conduct of a party is not
effective as a manifestation of his assent unless he intends to engage in the conduct and knows
or has reason to know that the other party may infer from his conduct that he assents."); id. § 19
cmt. b (providing definition of "reason to know"). Comment (b) states:
A person has reason to know a fact, present or future, if he has information from
which a person of ordinary intelligence would infer that the fact in question does
or will exist.... There is also reason to know if the inference would be that there
is such a substantial chance of the existence of the fact that, if exercising reasonable
care with reference to the matter in question, the person would predicate his action
upon the assumption of its possible existence.
Id.
28. Jonathan D. Hart et al., Cyberspace Liability, 523 PLI/Pat 123, 171 (1998).
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tract if one of the parties is not given adequate notice of the terms of the
contract. 9 On the other hand, courts sometimes bind a party to contractual
terms that are relatively hidden. 0 In the case of these web sites, the condi-
tions and copyright notices are often relatively hidden." The links are located
at the bottom of the web sites' home pages and are highlighted and usually
underlined to indicate that the user can click on them and see the actual terms
and conditions.32 Unless the web site owners make the terms more conspicu-
ous, a court could find that a user did not receive adequate notice of them.
2. Consideration
Also, a court may struggle to find an exchange of consideration between
the user and the information provider. A bargained for exchange of consider-
ation is a prerequisite to an enforceable contract.33 Therefore, the question is
whether an exchange of consideration occurs when the Internet user begins to
view the contents of one of the informational web sites. An exchange of con-
sideration may occur in a variety of ways.34 First, it is possible to argue that
29. See Lisi v. Alitalia-LinecAeree Italiane, 370 F.2d 508, 514 (2d Cir. 1966) (reasoning
that plaintiffs were not given adequate notice of airline's limited liability because statements
notifying passengers of limited liability were "ineffectively positioned, diminutively sized, and
unemphasized by bold face type, contrasting color, or anything else"), aff'd, 390 U.S. 455
(1968).
30. See Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585,595 (1991) (concluding that forum
selection clause contained in fine print on cruise line ticket will not be set aside because re-
spondents had adequate notice of clause, respondents failed to meet burden of proving inconve-
nience, and clause was not fundamentally unfair); Caspi v. Microsoft Network, 732 A.2d 528,
532 (N.J. Super. CL App. Div. 1999) (finding that plaintiffs had adequate notice of terms of
service and forum selection clause contained therein).
31. But see Hart et al., supra note 28, at 172 ("Many web publishers include a link to their
visitor agreement in a reasonably noticeable location, such as at the bottom of the home page
and perhaps other high traffic pages, often in proximity to copyright notices.").
32. For example, the link to the Washingtonpostcom's copyright notice is located at the
bottom of the home page, and is differentiated from the rest of the text because it is highlighted
in blue and underlined. Likewise, the link to ESPN.com's terms of use is located at the bottom
of the home page, together with a link to the site's Privacy Policy and Safety Information and
a link to the site's Employment Opportunities, and it is differentiated from the non-link text
because it is underlined.
33. See Yerkovich v. AAA, 610 N.W.2d 542,546 (Mich. 2000) ("An essential element of
a contract is legal consideration"); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1981) (stating
that "the formation efa contract requires a bargain in which there is... a consideration").
34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981) (describing requirement
and types of exchanges ofconsideration). Section 71 provides as follows:
(1) To constitute consideration, a prformance or a return promise must be bargained
for.
(2) A performance or return promise is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in
exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise.
1632
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the user provides consideration by implicitly promising to abide by the terms
of the web site,35 and the web site owner provides consideration by performing
the act of posting information."
Of course, the key inquiry is whether there was actually a bargain. 7 The
Restatement of Contract 38 provides that a "performance or return promise is
bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and
is given bythe promisee in exchange for that promise. ' 39 Under this language,
it can be argued that there is a bargain because the web site owner's perfor-
mance is sought by the user in exchange for the user's promise to abide by the
terms of service.
Second, it could be argued that there is an exchange of consideration
because there is an exchange of performances - that is, the web site owner
performs the act of providing information while the user performs the act of
abiding by the terms of service. According to the Restatement, a bargain can
consist of an exchange of performances.' Therefore, if the web site owner
and user exchange performances, the resulting bargain can constitute consid-
eration under § 71 of the Restatement.4
Third, an exchange of consideration may be found because, in these web
site situations, there is either a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the
promisee. Some courts use this benefit or detriment analysis in determining
whether valid consideration exists.42 Under this analysis, the web site owner
(3) The performance may consist of
(a) an act other than a promise, or
(b) a forbearance, or
(c) the creation, modification, or destruction of a legal relation.
(4) The performance or return promise may be given to the promisor or to some other
person. It may be given by the promisee or by some other person.
IM
35. See id. § 75 (stating that "a promise which is bargained for is consideration if but
only if, the promised performance would be consideration"). Therefore, a user's "promise" to
abide by the web site's terms is consideration if the performance of abiding by the terms itself
would constitute consideration. Most likely, this performance would constitute consideration.
36. See id. § 72 (stating that "any performance which is bargained for is consideration").
37. See id. § 71(1) ("To constitute consideration, a performance or a return promise must
be bargained for.") (emphasis added).
38. The Restatement, although not binding on courts, is highly persuasive authority.
39. RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 71(2) (1981).
40. See id. § 3 (stating that "[a] bargain is an agreement to exchange promises or to ex-
change a promise for a performance or to exchange performances").
41. See id. § 71 (explaining that exchange of performances can constitute consideration).
42. See Hurd v. Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, 707 N.E2d 609, 615 (Dl. App. Ct.
1999) (stating that "[a]ny act or promise that is a benefit to one party or a detriment to the other
is a sufficient consideration to support a contract"); Theobald v. Nosser, 752 So.2d 1036, 1040
(MIss. 1999) (stating that "'[a]ll that is needed to constitute a valid consideration to support an
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receives a benefit when the user views his site because, presumably, the more
Internet users that visit the web site, the more the web site owner can charge
advertisers. Conversely, the web site user suffers a detriment by surrendering
legal rights to which he or she might otherwise be entitled."3 On the other
hand, it can be said that the user gains a benefit by obtaining useful informa-
tion. Under either analysis, a court applying the benefit or detriment analysis
may conclude that the web site user agreement is supported by valid consider-
ation. Therefore, because of the various ways in which to find an exchange
of consideration, this requirement appears easier to satisfy than the require-
ment of mutual assent.
B. Expansion of Contract Law
In recent years, courts have found the existence of traditional contractual
requirements in previously unencountered situations. As mentioned above,
there are three new classes of cases that are potentially relevant to the enforce-
ability of online user agreements. The first ofthese are called clickwrap cases,
the second are commonly known as shrinkwrap cases, and the third are called
browsewrap cases. All three will be described herein, but the browsewrap
cases, and to a lesser extent the shrinkwrap cases, are most similar to the con-
tractual issues presented by online user agreements.
1. Clickwrap Cases
Clickwrap, or click-through, contracts are relevant to online user agree-
ments because they are actually created on the Internet. These cases involve
links on a web page that say "I agree" or "I disagree."" Normally, the user
must click on "I agree" in order to proceed through the site or register for the
service provided by the web site."4
In Groff v. Amenica Online, Inc.,46 the Superior Court of Rhode Island
addressed the validity of a clickwrap contract.47 Groffinvolved the enforce-
agreement or contract is that there must be either a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the
promisee. If either of these requirements exist, there is a sufficient consideration'" (quoting
American Olean Tile Co. v. Morton, 157 So.2d 788,790 (Miss. 1963))).
43. See Crocker v. Hood, 681 N.E.2d 460, 463 (Ohio Ct App. 1996) (explaining that "[a]
detriment may consist of some forbearance, loss or responsibility given, suffered or undertaken
by the promisee").
44. See infra notes 46-57 and accompanying text (discussing clickwrap cases).
45. See infra notes 46-57 and accompanying text (discussing requirement of clicking on
"I agree" in clickwrap cases).
46. 1998 WL 307001 (R. Super. 1998).
47. Groff v. Am. Online, Inc., 1998 WL 307001 (R.L Super. 1998) (ruling that forum
selection clause contained in defendant's terms of service was enforceable because user had
clicked his computer mouse on "I agree" button). In Groff, the plaintiff had registered for the
defendant's Internet service. Id. at *1. As a prerequisite to obtaining such service, the plaintiff
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ability of a forum selection clause contained in America Online's terms of
service. 8 The plaintiff, when registering for online service, had the option of
clicking on "I agree" or "I disagree" to the terms of service and chose the
former.4 9 However, he argued that he did not read the terms of service prior
to choosing "I agree" and that the parties had not negotiated the terms." The
court ruled against the plaintiff; explaining that he effectively signed the terms
by clicking on "I agree." The court therefore rejected the plaintiff's conten-
tion that he should not be bound because he did not see or read the terms. 2
Several other courts have reached conclusions similar to the one in Groff.
For example, in Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc.,53 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California held that a mass-market-
ing clickwrap agreement was indeed a binding contract.54 Also, in Caspi v.
Microsoft Network,55 the New Jersey Supreme Court explained that an elec-
tronic contract can be created by the click of a computer's mouse. 6 The court
had to signify that he assented to the defendant's terms of the service. Id. To procure this assent,
the defendant provided the plaintiff the option of clicking on an "I agree" link on the web page.
Id. Although he did not read the terms of the service, the plaintiff clicked on this link twice. Id.
at *5. The court found that this action was the equivalent of actually signing an agreement Id.
Therefore, the forum selection clause was an enforceable term of service. Id.
48. Id. at *2.
49. Id. at *5.
50. Id.
51. See id. (explaining that "plaintiff effectively 'signed' the agreement by clicking on 'I
agree' not once but twice").
52. See id. ("Under these circumstances, [the plaintiff] should not be heard to complain
that he did not see, read, etc. and is bound to the terms of his agreement").
53. 1998 WL 388389 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
54. Hotmail Corp. v. VanS Money Pie, Inc., 1998 WL 388389 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (ruling
that Hotmail was entitled to preliminary injunction against defendants because defendants
breached Hotmail's online terms of service by sending sparn and pornography via Internet). In
Hotnail, the plaintiff an email service provider, developed Terms of Service to which all
subscribers were required to agree. Id. at *2. One of these terms contained a prohibition against
sending spain, which is the term for unsolicited bulk email, or pornography via Hotmail's
service. Id. However, the defendants sent numerous spare messages, some of which advertised
pornography. Id. at *2-*3. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support a
finding that the defendants had agreed to abide by Hotmail's terms of service, and that, in
sending the sparn, they had breached these terms. Id. at *6. Therefore, the defendants were
enjoined from using Hotmail's service. Id. at *9.
55. 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct App. Div. 1999).
56. Caspi v. Microsoft Network, 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct App. Div. 1999) (holding
that forum selection clause contained in terms of service was enforceable). In Caspi, the
plaintiffs were subscribers to Microsoft's online computer service. Id. at 529. When registering
for service, the plaintiffs were presented with a membership agreement containing a forum selec-
tion clause. Id. at 530. They were given the choice to click on either an "I Agree" or an "I Don't
Agree" block. Id. Clicking on "I Agree" was necessary in order to obtain the service, and the
plaintiffs chose this option. Id. Therefore, Microsoft sought to enforce the forum selection
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found that the plaintiffs had adequate notice of a forum selection clause in the
defendant's terms of service, and, therefore, the clause was enforceable. 7
Clickwrap cases are significant because they involve the enforceability of
online contracts. These cases demonstrate that courts are aware that, through
the use of the Internet, parties have found new ways to create legal relation-
ships." In general, however, the clickwrap cases are distinguishable from
informational web site user agreements. The user agreements do not require
the user to click on an "I agree" link, as do elickwrap contracts. Rather, the user
agreements simply stipulate that they are binding on a user of that web site,
without requiring any affirmative act by the user." As a result of these differ-
ent facts, it is easier for a court to find a manifestation of assent in a clickwrap
case than it would be in the case of an online user agreement.6' Therefore, it is
necessary to examine other types of cases to find a closer analogy to the con-
tractual issues presented by informational web site user agreements.
2. Shrinkwrap Cases
Shrinkwrap cases involve packages that contain language stipulating
that the buyer is bound to the terms inside the package upon opening and
using the product contained inside.61 Usually, the seller gives the buyer the
opportunity to return the product within a specified period oftime ifthe buyer
is unsatisfied with the terms.62 Courts have reached different conclusions
regarding shrinkwrap contracts or licenses.63 The more recent line of cases
clause when the plaintiffs brought suit against it Id. at 529. The court endorsed the lower court's
conclusion that the forum selection clause was not the result of fraud or excessive bargaining
power. Id. at 530. Nor would enforcing the forum selection clause contravene public policy. Id.
at 531. The plaintiffs also argued that they were not given adequate notice of the forum selection
clause. Id. at 532. However, the court reasoned that the forum selection clause was presented
in the same manner as all of the other terms of the electronic contract. Id. The plaintiffs had been
free to scroll through the terms and read all of them. Id. Therefore, Mcrosoft had provided them
with adequate notice of the forum selection clause, and it was enforceable. Id.
57. Id. The court also relied on Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991), in
which the Supreme Court held that a forum selection clause located in the fine print on the back
of a cruise ticket was enforceable. Id.
58. See Dawn Davidson, Comment, Click and Commit: What Terms are Users Bound
to When They Enter Web Sites?,26 WM. MrrcHELLL. REv. 1171,1184-85 (2000) (arguingthat,
in enforcing dlickwrap contracts, courts acknowledge need for protection of online services).
59. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text (describing language of web site provi-
sions).
60. See supra notes 22-32 and accompanying text (discussing user's manifestation of
assent in online user agreements).
61. See infra notes 66-105 and accompanying text (discussing shrinkwrap cases).
62. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that
"[a]ny buyer ... can prevent formation of the contract by returning the package.").
63. The terms contract and license are used interchangeably in this Note.
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has upheld the validity of shrnlkwrap contracts," whereas another, older line
of cases held such contracts unenforceable under the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.)65
In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,' the Seventh Circuit addressed the en-
forceability of a shrinkwrap license.6' The defendant had purchased a soft-
ware package from the plaintiff ' The box in which the software was sold
contained a provision stating that the software came with restrictions de-
scribed in an enclosed license. 9 This license was printed in the software
manual and also encoded on the software so that it would appear on the com-
puter screen every time the buyer ran the program 7  Although this license
limited the use of the software to non-commercial purposes, the defendant
breached the license by reselling the information contained on the software.71
As a result, ProCD sued to enforce the terms of the shfinkwrap contract.
72
The Seventh Circuit first rejected the defendant's argument that the terms of
a contract must be made known before any exchange of consideration.73 The
court also approved of the efficient nature of standardized contracts in a sys-
64. See infra notes 66-90 and accompanying text (discussing cases holding shinkwrap
contracts enforceable).
65. See infra notes 91-105 and accompanying text (discussing cases holding shrinkwrap
contracts unenforceable).
66. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
67. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that shrink-
wrap contract limiting use of software to non-commercial uses was enforceable). In ProCD,
the Seventh Circuit addressed the enforceability of a shrinkwrap contract that limited the use
of the purchased software to non-commercial purposes. Id. at 1450. The defendant, Zeiden-
berg, had purchased a software package called SelectPhone from ProCD. Ict Despite the
prohibition against commercial use of the software, Zeidenberg resold the information contained
in the software to customers over the Internet, and ProCD sued to enforce the terms of the
shrinkwrap contract. Id. The Seventh Circuit treated the license as an ordinary contract ac-
companying the sale of goods, which therefore was governed by the U.C.C. Id. The court
reasoned that the U.C.C. does not require full disclosure of the terms of the contract to precede
the payment of money. Id. at 1452. In fact, the court explained that such standardized contracts
can be beneficial in the marketplace. Id. Section 2-204(1) of the U.C.C. states that a contract
may be made "in any manner sufficient to show agreement.... ." Id. Here, because ProCD
provided its terms in the shrinkwrap contract and because Zeidenberg did not return the soft-
ware after having the opportunity to inspect thew terms, the court found that § 2-204 was satis-
fied. Id. Therefore, Zcidenberg breached the contract by selling the information contained in
the software. Id. at 1455.





73. See id. (stating thattransactions in which exchange ofmoney precedes communication
of terms are common).
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tern of mass production and distribution.74 Finally, the court relied on section
2-204(1) ofthe U.C.C., 75 which states that "[a] contract for sale of goods may
be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by
both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract. 76
A case similar to ProCD is Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.7 In this case, the
Hills bought a computer from Gateway. 8 The box in which the computer was
shipped contained a list of terms that were said to govern the parties' relation-
ship unless the Hills returned the computer within 30 days.79  These terms
contained an arbitration clause, and when the Hills brought suit in federal
court, alleging that the computer had various problems, they argued that this
clause should be rendered unenforceable because it "did not stand out. "so The
Seventh Circuit explained that the entire list of shrinkwrap terms must either
stand or fall together; the arbitration clause alone could not be held unenforce-
able.8' The court followed ProCD and declined to limit ProCD's holding to
software.' As in ProCD, the court sympathized with the usefulness of
contracts in which the payment of money preceded the full disclosure of the
terms of the contract. 3 Accordingly, the court held that the arbitration clause
was enforceable.8 4
74. See id. at 1451 ("'Standardization of agreements serves many of the same functions
as standardization of goods and services; both are essential to a system of mass production and
distribution.'" (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt a)).
75. Id. at 1452.
76. U.C.C. § 2-204(1).
77. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
78. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147,1151 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that arbitra-
tion clause in shrinkwrap license was enforceable). In Hill, the Hills bought a computer from
Gateway, and the computer packaging included a list of terms that were said to govern the
computer unless the Hills returned the computer within 30 days. Id. at 1148. The terms in-
cluded an arbitration clause. Id. However, the Hills filed suit in federal court, claiming that the
computer had various flaws. Id. Gateway sought to enforce the arbitration clause, but the Hills
argued that the clause was invalid because it was inconspicuous. Id The Seventh Circuit
explained that the terms were enforceable even if the Hills had not read them. Id. Following
ProCD, the court reasoned that parties may form a valid contract by providing the list of con-
tract terms in a shrinkwrap license. Id. at 1148-49. The court declined to limit ProCD to cases
involving software sales. Id. at 1149. Therefore, the arbitration clause was enforceable against
the Hills. Id. at 1151.
79. Id. at 1148.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 1149 (explaining that "ProCD is about the law of contract, not the law of
software").
83. See id. (asserting that "[plractical considerations support allowing vendors to enclose
the full legal terms with their products").
84. Id. at 1151.
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The Supreme Court of Washington followed the holdings of ProCD and
Hill in M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp. 8 In Timberline, the
buyer of computer software argued that a limitation of damages clause con-
tained in a shrinkwrap license was unenforceable.86 The buyer urged that the
parties' purchase order constituted their entire agreement and that it never saw
or agreed to the terms of the shrinkwrap license."7 However, the shrinkwrap
license clearly indicated that the buyer's use of the enclosed software would
signify the buyer's assent to the terms of the license. 8  Therefore, the court
held that the terms of the shrinkwrap license, including the limitation of
damages clause, were part of the parties' contract.8 9 By using the software,
the buyer signified its assent to the terms of the license; it was irrelevant that
the buyer did not actually read the agreement.
However, it should be noted that some courts have found shrinkwrap
contracts unenforceable. For example, in Vault Corporation v. Quaid Soft-
ware, Ltd.,"' the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's holding thatthe shrink-
wrap contract at issue was an adhesion contract and was therefore invalid. 2
85. MA. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000)
(holding that limitation of damages clause in shrinkwrap license was enforceable). In Timber-
line, Mortenson purchased software from Timberline and then claimed that the software was
defective. Id. at 307. Mortenson sought consequential damages, but a shiinkwrap contract that
had accompanied the software limited Timberline's liability to the license fee paid for the right
to use the software. Id. at 309. Mortenson argued that the parties' purchase order constituted
the entire agreement between the parties and that it had not agreed to the terms of the shrink-
wrap license. Id. at 309-10. However, the court held that the terms of the shrinkwrap license
were part of the parties' agreement Id. at 313. The shrinkwrap license stated that the buyer's
use of the product signified assent to the terms; therefore, after using the software, Mortenson
was bound by the terms, including the limitation of damages clause. Id.
86. Idat31O.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 308 (quoting shrinkwrap license's language that "[u]se of the programs
indicates your acknowledgment that you have read this license, understand it, and agree to be
bound by its terms and conditions").
89. Id. at313.
90. See id. (stating that "it was not necessary for [the buyer] to actually read the agreement
in order to be bound by it").
91. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
92. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that
shrinkwrap contract was invalid in part because it conflicted with federal law). In Vault, a
provision in the seller's license agreement prohibited decompilation or disassembly of its
program. Id. at 257 n.2. The seller, Vault, brought a copyright infringement action against the
buyer, Quaid, claiming that Quaid had copied Vault's program in order to design its own
program. Id. at 258. Vault also argued that Quaid had breached the shrinkwrap license. Id.
However, the Fifth Circuit upheld the District Court's ruling that the shrinkwrap contract was
an adhesion contract Id. at 269-70. Oddly, the court gave no support for its finding that the
shrinkwrap license was an adhesion contract Id.
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But it can be argued that Vault was actually a case concerning federal preemp-
tion of state law rather than a contract case.9" Even so, Vault is significant
because it apparently reaches a holding opposite those of ProCD, Hill, and
Mortenson.94
Similarly, the Third Circuit in Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse
Technology ' held that a shrinkwrap license was invalid.1 However, Step-
Saver is a decade old, and the court used § 2-207 of the U.C.C. to govern its
analysis.97 Under § 2-207, the court held that the terms on the shrinkwrap
license were merely proposed additions to the contract because they would
have substantially altered the parties' agreement. 9 The seller had previously
attempted to procure the buyer's express acceptance of these terms in writing,
but the buyer had refused. 9 This fact suggested that the seller wanted its
terms to be included in the contract, but had been unable "to obtain a negoti-
93. See Vault, 847 F.2d at 269-70 (citing district court, which explained that shrinkwrap
license could only be valid if Louisiana state statute under which it was authorized was valid).
The state statute was known as the Louisiana License Act, and it authorized a complete ban on
copying of a much wider range of materials than protected by the Federal Copyright Act. Id.
at 26869. The district court noted numerous conflicts between the state statute and the federal
law. Id. at 269. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the Louisiana statute provision prohibiting
copying by decompilation or disassembly "clearly 'touches upon an area' of federal copyright
law" and was therefore "preempted by federal law." Id. at 270.
94. But see ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing
Vault because Vault was copyright infringement case, not consumer transaction case).
95. 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991).
96. Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that,
under U.C.C. § 2-207, terms of shinkwrap license did not become part of contract). In Step-
Saver, the court addressed the enforceability of a "Limited Use License Agreement" printed on
the software packaging. Id. at 93. This "Agreement" contained both disclaimer of warranty and
limitation of remedies terms. Id. at 96. However, the court explained that, under § 2-207, these
terms were merely proposed additions to the parties' contract Me at 103. These terms would
have materially altered the parties' pre-existing agreement Id. at 106. In fact, the seller had
previously tried to obtain the buyer's assent to these terms, but the buyer had refused. Id. at
103. Therefore, the court refused to allow the seller to sneak the terms into the agreement by
using a shrinkwrap license. Id. at 105-06.
97. See id. at 98 ("When the parties's [sic] conduct establishes a contract, but the parties
have failed to adopt expressly a particular writing as the terms of their agreement, and the
writings exchanged by the parties do not agree, U.C.C. § 2-207 determines the terms of the
contract").
98. See id. at 105 (explaining that under § 2-207, "an additional term detailed in the box-
top license will not be incorporated into the parties' contract if the term's addition to the con-
tract would materially alter the parties's [sic] agreement"). The court's use of § 2-207 is an
important factor distinguishing Step-Saver from ProCD. In fact, in ProCD, the court disre-
garded Step-Saver because it "is a battle-of-the-forms case, in which the parties exchange
incompatible forms and a court must decide which prevails." ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452.
99. See id at 104 (noting that "there is evidence that [the seller] tried to obtain [the buy-
er]'s express consent to the disclaimer and limitation of damages provision of the box-top
license").
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ated agreement reflecting its terms," and thus those terms were "not a part of
the parties's [sic] commercial bargain.""l° Therefore, the shrinkwrap license
never became part of the parties' contract."
However, cases decided after Step-Saver either distinguished or disre-
garded that case. For example, the ProCD court dismissed Step-Saver as a
simple U.C.C. § 2-207 case."° As such, it was inapplicable to the shrinkwrap
license at issue in ProCD.°" Similarly, the Timberline court distinguished
Step-Saver. First, the court explained that, whereas the issue in Timberline
was the enforceability of the license against the end user, the issue in Step-
Saver was the enforceability of the license against a retailer, not the end
user.1°4 Second, in Step-Saver, but not in Timberline, the buyer refused to
express consent to the seller's terms, but the seller provided the product any-
way 5 These distinguishing factors permitted the ProCD and Timberline
courts to reach opposite holdings from the Step-Saver court.
Some commentators have also addressed the issue of the enforceability
of shrinkwrap contracts."° The commentators are split as to whether such
100. Id.
101. Id. at 106.
102. See ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447,1452 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Step-Saveris a battle-
of-the-forms case, in which the parties exchange incompatible forms and a court must decide
which prevails.").
103. See id. (explaining that Step-Saver does not directly address issue presented in current
case).
104. See MA. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 312 (Wash.
2000) (explaining that Step-Saver "did not involve the enforceability of a standard license
agreement against an end user of the software, but instead involved its applicability to a value
added retailer who simply included the software in an integrated system sold to the end user").
105. See id. ("[l]n Step-Saver, the seller of the program twice asked the buyer to sign an
agreement comparable to their disputed license agreement Both times the buyer refused, but
the seller continued to make the software available. In contrast, Mortenson and Timberline had
utilized a license agreement throughout Mortenson's use ofthe... software.").
106. See, e.g., Stephen J. Davidson & Michael J. Wurzer, Shrink-Wrap Licenses: The
Continuing Controversy, 453 PLI/Pat 673, 678 (1996) (addressing two "hotly disputed" ques-
tions of "[i]s [a shrinkwrap] license part of the 'contract' between the user and the vendor given
that the user probably did not read the license and did not expressly assent to its terms prior to
payment and delivery of the software" and "[a]re any of the typical terms of such a license
preempted by federal copyright law?"); David A. Einhourn, Shrink-wrap Licenses: The Debate
Continues, 38 IDEA 383,401 (1998) (concluding that ProCD and Step-Saver "created a clear
split between the [Tjhird and [S]eventh circuits" so that "[i]t is not clear which approach other
circuits will follow in the future"); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap
Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239,1248 (1995) (summarizing that courts consider three issues
in analyzing shrinkwrap licenses: whether license is valid under contract law, whether particu-
lar intellectual property terms of license are enforceable, and whether intellectual property terms
are preempted); Stephen P. Tarolli, Comment, The Future of Information Commerce Under
Contemporary Contract and Copyright Principles, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1639, 1648 (1997)
(stating that enforceability of shrinkwrap licenses is unclear but that "[aipproximately two-thirds
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contracts should be held valid and whether shrinkwrap enforceability is con-
sistent with the principles of contract law." 7 Most of the scholarly debate
arose ater the Seventh Circuit's decision in ProCD. However, this debate has
primarily focused on the effect of shrinkwrap contracts on the software indus-
try,1 and, with a few exceptions, 9 the scholars have not extended the signifi-
cance of shrinkwrap contracts beyond the context of the sale of goods to the
arena of information exchanges.
3. Browsewrap Cases
Browsewrap cases involve factual scenarios that are similar to the scenar-
ios presented by the terms and conditions on informational web sites. Browse-
wrap cases involve alleged agreements that are available to the user by clicking
on a link on the web site home page." ° That link will then take the user to a
new page within the web site, and the terms and conditions of use of the web
site am listed on this new page."' The user is not required to view the terms
and conditions prior to use of the web site, and the user is also not required to
make any affirmative act to signify assentto those terms and conditions."2
of the respondents polled in a recent survey of computer law professionals agreed that shrink-
wrap licenses accompanying mass-marketed products should be enforceable").
107. Compare Stephen Fraser, i2anada-United States Trade Issues: Backfrom Purgatory?
Why Computer Software "Shrink-Wrap" Licenses Should be Laid to Rest, 6 TUL. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 183, 233 (1998) (concluding that "there are few reasons for the continued use of
shrink-wrap licenses for computer software") and Kristin Johnson Hazelwood, Note, Let the
Buyer Beware: The Seventh Circuit's Approach toAccept-or-Return Offers, 55 WsH. & LEE
L. REV. 1287, 1305 (1998) (arguing that Seventh Circuit's analysis of ProCD and ill was
faulty because court misapplied U.C.C. contract provisions, unfairly favored seller of goods, and
enforced terms that surprised buyer), with Jerry David Monroe, ProCD, Inc. v. Zddenberg- An
Emerging Trend in Shrinkwrap Licensing?, 1 MARQ. INTEU. PROP. L. REV. 143, 170 (1997)
(arguing that "there is no evidence that shrinkwrap licenses are antithetical to the policies of
contract lavr, rather, the Seventh Circuit's remarks [in ProCD] properly indicate that they
promote this policy without demonstrable harm to either contracting party").
108. See Robert 3. Morrill, Contract Formation and the Shrink Wrap License: A Case
Comment on ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 32NEWENG.L. REV. 513,514 (1998) (explaining that,
if'PoCD is viewed as strong precedent, then Seventh Circuit's holding "represents a substantial
shift in power to software vendors"); Jeffrey C. Selman & Christopher S. Chen, Steering the
Titanic Clear of the Iceberg. Saving the Sale of Software from the Perils of Warranties, 31
U.S.F. L. REV. 531, 533 (1997) (arguing that, within software industry, sellers should be per-
mitted to present binding contract terms to buyers after point of sale); Monroe, supra note 107,
at 144 (stating that shfinkwrap licenses are "especially prevalent in the computer software
industry").
109. See TaroL, supra note 106, at 1642 (arguing that contemporary contract law is not
well adapted to protect information exchanges).
110. See infra notes 113-29 and accompanying text (discussing browsewrap cases).
111. See infra notes 113-29 and accompanying text (discussing browsewrap cases).
112. See infra notes 113-29 and accompanying text (discussing browsewrap cases).
1642
COULD FAIR USE EQUAL BREACH OF CONTRACT?
There are few reported cases involving browsewrap agreements. In one
such case, Pollstar v. GigmaniaLtd.," the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of California addressed the plaintiff's breach of a browsewrap
contract claim. 1 4 The terms ofthe browsewrap agreement were accessible to
the defendant by clicking on a link on the plaintiff's home web page.' That
link would then take the defendant to a different web page containing the
terms ofthe agreement." 6 Despite the fact that the defendant was not required
to view the terms or make some affirmative act signifying assent to those
terms, the court declined to dismiss the plaintiff's breach of contract claim." 7
The court stated that "[t]aking into consideration the examples provided by the
Seventh Circuit [in ProCD] - showing that people sometimes enter into a
contract by using a service without first seeing the terms - the browse[ ] wrap
license agreement may be arguably valid and enforceable."'"
Specht v. Netscape Communications Corporation"9 is the other signifi-
cant browsewrap case. 2 In Specht, the plaintiff web site users downloaded
113. 2000 WL 33266437 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17,2000).
114. Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., No. CIV-F-00-5671-REC SM, 2000 WL 33266437 (ED.
Cal. Oct 17,2000) (hesitating to declare invalidity of browsewrap agreement). InPollstar, the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant had breached the license agreement set forth on the plaintiff's
web site. Id. at *1. The defendant replied that the breach of contract claim failed because the
plaintiff could not allege mutual assent Id. The agreement at issue was not set forth on the
plaintiff's home web page, but rather on a page that was linked to the home page. Id. at *6. The
defendant was notified of the agreement by a small notice on the home page. Ie By clicking on
that notice, the defendant would be taken to the page containing the actual terms of the agree-
ment. Id. The defendant was not required to view the page containing the agreement, nor was
the defendant required to make an affirmative act to signify assent. Id. Nevertheless, the court
declined to find the agreement unenforceable for lack of mutual assent. Id. The court relied on





119. 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
120. Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(finding that web site users had not assented to license agreement). In Specht, the web site users
had visited Netscape's web site and downloaded a free software program known as SmartDown-
load from that web site. Id. at 587. The web page from which the users downloaded the soft-
ware also contained an "invitation" to view the terms of the SmartDownload license agreement.
Id. at 588. Those terms were accessible only if the users chose to click on the underlined por-
tion of the invitation. Id. By doing so, the users would be linked to the page containing the
actual terms of the agreement Id. The users, however, were not required to view the terms
before downloading the software, nor were they required to signify assent to the terms by click-
ing on a link, as in the clickwrap cases. Id. The court likened the case to the Pollstar browse-
wrap case. Id. at 594-95. However, the court reached the opposite conclusion from the Politar
court. Id. at 598. The court explained that "Netscape's failure to require users of SmartDown-
load to indicate assent to its license as a precondition to downloading and using its software is
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free software from Netscape's web site."' When a dispute arose between the
plaintiffs andNetscape, Netscape arguedthattheparties wereboundto an arbi-
tration clause within a license agreement available on the web site.1' The
license agreement was available to users of the web site if they chose to click
on certain underlined text within an invitation to view the terms of the web
site.' However, the plaintiffs were not required to either view the agreement
or signify assent to it prior to downloading the software. 24 Thus, the court
found that the agreement was unenforceable for lack ofmutual assent."2 The
court explained that "downloading is hardly an unambiguous indication of
assent."' Netscape both failed to require users to indicate assent to the agree-
ment and failed even to require users to view the agreement before down-
loading the software. 27 The language on Netscape's web site did "not indicate
that a user must agree to the license terms before downloading and using the
software."'" Consequently, the agreement lacked mutual assent." 9
C. Extrapolating from Clickwrap, Shrinkwrap, and Browsewrap Cases
Should a dispute concerning the enforceability of the terms and condi-
tions of an informational web site arise, the court will probably examine the
clickwrap, shrinkwrap, and browsewrap cases for guidance. 3' The browse-
wrap cases in particular are relevant to the issue of whether the terms and
conditions of informational web sites are enforceable; however, due to the
recentness of these cases, legal commentators have not yet addressed them.
On the other hand, at least two commentators have argued that the trend
toward enforcing shrinkwrap and cickwrap contracts increases the probability
that a court will hold an online user agreement enforceable.' These corn-
fatal to its argument that a contract has been formed." Ma at 595. Furthermore, the web site
users were not even made aware that they were entering into a contract Id. Consequently, the
court found that the users "did not assent to the license agreement. . . I" d. at 596.
121. Id. at 587.
122. Id. at 588.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 596.
126. Id. at 595.
127. Id. at 588.
128. Id. at 596.
129. Id.
130. To date, no court has addressed the issue of the enforceability of the Internet site
terms addressed in this Note.
131. See Hart et al., supra note 28, at 172 (arguing that, if websites provide link at bottom
of home page and advise users that they will be bound by terms of site, these websites will
increase "the likelihood that the terms of the agreement will be deemed enforceable in light of
the ProCD decision"); Davidson, supra note 58, at 1185 (explaining that trend toward holding
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mentators believe thatthe enforceability of shrinkwrap contracts, in particular,
suggests that online user agreements are valid contracts.132 The holding in the
Pollstar case suggests that these commentators are correct; however, the hold-
ing in the Specht case suggests that they are incorrect. To evaluate more
clearly the applicability of the clickwrap, shrinkwrap, and browsewrap cases
to the case of an informational web site user agreement, it is necessary to
examine more closely the relevance of each of these classes of cases.
1. The Relevance of Clickwrap Cases
As previously mentioned, clickwrap contracts are significantbecause they
are contracts that the parties actually create on the Internet. 3 ' However,
clickwrap contracts are distinguishable from the situation presented by online
user agreements because in clickwrap cases, the user actually manifests assent
by clicking his or her mouse on the "I agree" link. 34 Online user agreements
do not require the user to signify actual assent to the agreements or even to
view the terms of the agreements. Thus, the precedent set by the clickwrap
cases is of little assistance in evaluating the enforceability of online user agree-
ments.
2. The Relevance of Shrinkwrap Cases
In shrinkwrap cases, the buyer's manifestation ofassent is not as obvious.
Therefore, the shrinkwrap cases are more analogous to online user agreements
thanthe clickwrap cases. That is, a buyer who opens a package and is instantly
bound by the terms contained in the package 35 is similar to an Internet user
who views a web site and is instantly bound by the terms of that web site. In
shrinkwrap cases, the user may not read - or perhaps even be aware of - the
restrictions accompanyingthe product. 36 Similarly, auserwho visits a certain
web site may not read or be aware of the restrictions imposed on his or her use
of that web site. The fact that courts have found shrinkwrap contracts to be
clickwrap contracts enforceable "is encouraging . . . because it illustrates that courts are
acknowledging the need for protection of online products and services," but that "shrinkwrap
agreement cases will be more helpful in determining the validity of online user agreements").
132. See Hart et al., supra note 28, at 172 (focusing on effect ofProCD); Davidson, supra
note 58, at 1185 (asserting that shrinkwrap cases are more useful in analyzing online agree-
ments).
133. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing online nature of clickwrap
contracts).
134. See supra notes 44-60 and accompanying text (discussing clickwrap contracts).
135. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that
ProCD's product boxes "declare[d] that the software comes with restrictions stated in an en-
closed license").
136. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (discussing enforceability of arbitration
clause that "did not stand out" in Hill case).
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valid, despite the questionable manifestation of assent may suggest that courts
will also find online user agreements valid.
37
However, there are also several distinguishing factors between shrink-
wrap contracts and online user agreements. First, shrinkwrap terms are more
noticeable than online terms. The buyer of a product that is governed by a
shrinkwrap contract has advance notice of the shrinkwrap terms because those
terms are contained on the packaging of the product' 38 Online user agree-
ments, however, are contained several links within the web site.139 As a result,
a court may find that the web site owner has not provided the user with
adequate notice of the terms. Second, shrinkwrap cases are distinguishable
because they involve the sale of goods, and courts have relied on the U.C.C.
to analyze the contracts.140 Finally, because shrinkwrap cases involve the sale
of goods, courts have not struggled to find an exchange of consideration in
these cases.' 4 ' In the case of online user agreements, however, a court may
decide that there is no exchange of consideration. These distinguishing factors
may compel a court to decide that, despite the enforceability of shrinkwrap
contracts, web site user agreements are unenforceable.
3. The Relevance ofBrowsewrap Cases
The key factors that distinguish shrinkwrap cases from the case of an
online user agreement all seem to disappear in the factual scenarios presented
by the browsewrap cases. Inbrowsewrap eases, the online user has no advance
notice of the terms of the agreement.'42 The user can access the web site and
download information therefrom without viewing the terms of the supposed
agreement or committing any act that might signify assent to that agreement.'43
This factual scenario is much different than the facts of a shrinkwrap case, in
which the buyer is first confronted with packaging stating that, by opening the
package, the buyer will be bound by the terms ofthe agreement unless the user
promptly returns the product. In browsewrap cases, the contractual require-
ment of mutual assent is even more elusive than in shrinkwrap cases.
137. See Davidson, supra note 58, at 1185 (arguing that question of notice or knowledge
of terms makes shrinkwrap contracts similar to online user agreements).
138. See supra notes 66-105 and accompanying text (discussing location of shrinkwrap
terms).
139. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text (discussing noticeability of online user
agreements).
140. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text (discussing ProCD court's use of
U.C.C.); supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text (discussing role of U.C.C. in Step-Saver).
141. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (describing ProCD court's explanation that
contracts in which exchange of consideration precedes terms of contract are permissible).
142. See supra Part I.B.3 (discussing browsewrap cases).
143. See supra Part IIB.3 (discussing browsewrap cases).
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Therefore, the browsewrap cases are most directly relevant to the issue
of informational web site user agreements. Consequently, a court analyzing
such user agreements will probably afford the browsewrap cases the most
weight in deciding how to rule. The two United States District Courts that
have addressed browsewrap cases, however, have reached opposite conclu-
sions.'44 If a court is persuaded by Specht, the court will find the user agree-
ment unenforceable. On the other hand, if a court is persuaded by Pollstar,
the court may find the user agreement to be valid and enforceable. Thus, the
emnergence of the browsewrap cases has created more confusion in this field
of contract law.
145
D. Potential Impact of the Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act (UCJTA)
In 1999, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws promulgated a model statute addressing information transactions known
as the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA or the Act).
States are now free to adopt UCITA in whole or in part." UCITA defines a
computer information transaction as "an agreement or the performance of it
to create, modify, transfer, or license computer information or informational
rights in computer information. 1 47  Under this definition, a web site user
agreement may fall under the Act because it is an agreement to transfer or
license information. 41 Commentators have explained that the Act "refers to
transactions where the subject matter includes information that is in, or is to
be provided or created in, a form that is directly capable of being processed
in or received from a computer." '49 Because informational web sites provide
information that is processed and received by a computer, the Act could have
an impact on the enforceability of online user agreements.
144. See supra notes 113-29 and accompanying text (discussing Pollstar and Specht cases).
145. To date, no legal commentators have attempted to clear the confusion that Pollstar
and Specht created. Furthermore, no appeals court has addressed the issue yet
146. However, the only states to adopt UCITA so far are Maryland and Virginia. MD. CODE
ANN., [COM.LAWI] § 22-101 etseq. (2001); VA. CODEANN. § 59.1-501.1 etseq. (Michie2000).
147. UCITA § 102(aXl 1) (2000).
148. See id. § 102(aX65)(B) (defining transfer with respect to computer information as "a
sale, license, or lease of a copy of the computer information"). Because the transfer of informa-
tion on the web sites addressed in this Note cannot be classified as a sale or lease, such transfer
must be a license. The Act defines a license as "a contract that authorizes access to, or use,
distribution, performance, modification, or reproduction of; information or informational rights,
but expressly limits the access or uses authorized or expressly grants fewer than all rights in the
information." Id. § 102(aX41). Because the user agreements are contracts that authorize the
user to access the information on the web site, they can properly be classified as licenses.
149. Raymond T. Nimmer & Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., UCITA: A Commercial Code for the
New Commerce, 600 PLIIPat 9,16 (2000).
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UCITA provides that contract formation occurs whenever there is a
showing of an agreement.I s" As always, a manifestation of assent is required,
and UCITA contains provisions describing the methods by which a manifesta-
tion of assent may occur. Section 112(a) of UCITA provides that:
A person manifests assent to a record or term ffthe person, acting with, or
after having an opportunity to review the record or term or a copy of it:
(1) authenticates the record or term with intent to adopt or accept it; or
(2) intentionally engages in conduct or makes statements with reason to
know thatthe otherpartyorits electronic agent may inferfromthe conduct
or statement that the person assents to the record or term. 3
This language is similar to § 19(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts.15 2 Under UC1TA, an Internet user manifests assent to the terms of the
web site if that user has knowledge of, or an opportunity to review, the terms
and subsequently continues to use the web site with reason to know that the
web site owner will infer that the user has assented to the terms. 5 3 Section
112(e) of UCITA further specifies that "[a] person has an opportunity to
review a record or term only if it is made available in a manner that ought to
call it to the attention of a reasonable person and permit review."'5 4 There-
fore, as in traditional mutual assent, the question becomes whether the links
to the web site terms are located and highlighted such that they call attention
to a reasonable person.1 55
UCITA also addresses the enforceability of standard-form licenses that
govern information made available from an Internet site.' These licenses,
150. See UCITA § 202(a) (providing that "[a] contract may be formed in any manner
sufficient to show agreement").
151. Id. § 112(a).
152. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (providing text of § 19(2) of Restatement).
153. UCITA § 112(a).
154. Id. § 112(c).
155. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text (discussing noticeability of web site
user agreements).
156. UC1TA§211. This section states:
This section applies to a licensor that makes its computer information available to
a licensee by electronic means from its Internet or similar electronic site. In such
a case, the licensor affords an opportunity to review the terms of a standard form
license which opportunity satisfies Section 112(e) with respect to a licensee that
acquires the information from that site, if the icensor.
(1) makes the standard terms of the license readily available for review by the
licensee before the information is delivered or the licensee becomes obligated to
pay, whichever occurs first, by-
displaying prominently and in close proximity to a description of the computer
information, or to instructions or steps for acquiring it, the standard terms or a
reference to an electronic location from which they can be readily obtained; or
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which are precisely the types of contracts at issue in informational web site
user agreements, must be presented in such a manner as to provide the user
with an opportunity to review it either "before the information is delivered or
the licensee [user] becomes obligated to pay, whichever occurs first .... 057
Because the user is never obligated to pay for use of the informational web
sites, the user must have an opportunity to review the terms before receiving
the information. However, this requirement might be impossible to satisfy
because the web site user does not have an opportunity to review until the
information is delivered, not before the information is delivered. ' s However,
the Act further provides that an opportunity to review may occur by "disclos-
ing the availability ofthe standard terms in a prominent place on the site from
which the computer information is offered and promptly furnishing a copy of
the standard terms on request before the transfer of the computer informa-
tion." '159 Under this language, a web site may satisfy the opportunity to review
requirement because the site discloses the availability of the terms of the user
agreement on the home site from which the information is offered."6 Also,
the user can promptly gain a copy of the terms by requesting them, that is, by
clicking on the link to those terms. This argument, of course, is by no means
assured to convince a court, but it does seem as if§ 211 ofUCITA contem-
plates the type of Internet user agreements present on informational web sites.
Several scholars have addressed the impact of UCITA on contract
formation, and most seem to agree that the Act provides needed standards in
the area of information transactions. 6' Some say that the Act favors informa-
disclosing the availability of the standard terms in a prominent place on the site
from which the computer information is offered and promptly furnishing a copy of
the standard terms on request before the transfer of the computer information; and
(2) does not take affirmative acts to prevent printing or storage of the standard
terms for archival or review purposes by the licensee.
Id.
157. Id.
158. This conclusion, however, may be avoided by arguing that the information is not
contained on the web site's home page, but rather behind the links to the news articles and other
items of information located deeper in the web site.
159. UCITA § 211(1)(B).
160. Of course, the question remains whether the terms are located in a prominent place.
See supra notes 27-32 (discussing noticeability of terms and conditions).
161. SeeAlvinC.HarrellUCITA: Opportunity orObstruction,25 OKLA. CITYU. L. REV.
333, 336 (2000) (explaining that, regarding "specific issues, such as the enforcement of form
contracts or standardized agreements, UCITA combines principles from a variety of current
sources of law to recognize rules that are thought to work fairly and efficiently in the context
of software licenses and other computer information transactions"); Raymond T. Nimmer,
UCITA: A Commercial Contract Code, CoMPIrERLAW, May 2000, at 3,5 (2000) (explaining
that UCITA will clarify and "make uniform contract law applicable to computer information
transactions"); Nimmer & Ring, supra note 149, at 21 (asserting that 'UCITA provides stand-
ards for when proposed terms are or are not adopted as part of the contract").
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tion providers over consumers. 62 However, no court has yet interpreted
UCITA, and it is far from being a "uniform" law. In many ways, it simply
repeats other sources of law, such as case law and the Restatement of Con-
tracts." Even so, UCITA may become an important factor in analyzing the
validity of online user agreements.
E. Conclusion of Contract Section
Online user agreements present issues concerning the contractual require-
ments of mutual assent and consideration. The above analysis of these re-
quirements demonstrates that, while it is possible for a court to find informa-
tional web site agreements enforceable, such an outcome is not definite.rs 4
The current trend toward enforcing new types of contracts - cickwrap con-
tracts and shrinkwrap contracts - indicates that courts are willing to find valid
contracts in new situations. However, the emergence of the factually similar
browsewrap cases and the inconsistent court rulings regarding browsewrap
contracts suggest that courts may not be willing to extend traditional contract
law principles further into the realm of the Intemet. Furthermore, assuming
for the moment that these online agreements are enforceable, the copyright
notices contained in the agreements raise a new and difficult question. That
question is whether or not the copyright provisions - as parts of a contract
under state law - are preempted by federal copyright law.
III. Federal Copyright Law Applied to Informational Web Sites
A. Federal Copyright Law - Subject Matter
17 U.S.C. § 102 governs the subject matter of federal copyright law. 65
Informational web sites fall within the statutory definition ofthe subject matter
162. See Michael I. Lockerby, UCITA: The Uniform Computer Information Transactions
Act,7 RIC. J.L. &TEC. 12 (Symposium2000), athttpJ/www.richmond.edujolv7i2/lockerby.
html (explaining that, because UCITA is more certain and consistent than current law, busi-
nesses will prefer it); James S. Heller, The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
(UCITA): Still Not Ready for Prime Time, 7 RcH. J.L. & TEcIL 14 (Symposium 2000), at
http'J/www.richmond.edujolVv7i2/heller.html (arguing that UCITA is unbalanced because "it
tips the scales in favor of information creators and vendors at the expense of those who use
information"); Stephen Y. Chow, UCITA: A 1990's Vision ofE-Commerce, 18 J. MARSHAIL
J. COMPUrEP & INFO. L. 323,337 (1999) (stating that "UCITA contract formation rules allow
the party embedding contract terms in an information product to prevail in every case").
163. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text (discussing similarity between UCITA
language and Restatement language).
164. Additionally, the outcome may not even be definite under UCITA.
165. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994) provides as follows:
Subject matter of copyright In general
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works
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of copyright for several reasons. First, -under § 102, informational web sites
are "original works of authorship."166 The general test for originality requires
"only that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to
copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree
of creativity."'" Under this test, informational web sites should be regarded
as original works. Also, § 102 states that literary works and audiovisual works
are works of authorship."es Thus, informational web sites are works of author-
ship because they can be classified as either literary works 69 or audiovisual
works.17° In addition, informational web sites can be characterized as news
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
cated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship
include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend
to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle,
or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated,
or embodied in such work.
Id.
166. Id. § 102(a).
167. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural TeL Sere. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991); see also 1
MELVIL.B.NIMMER&DAVDNIMMEUNIMMM ON COPYRIGHT § 2.10[A] (2000) ("Original-
ity in the copyright sense means only that the work owes its origin to the author, ie., is inde-
pendently created, and not copied from other works.") [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT].
168. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (providing that works of authorship include literary works and
audiovisual works).
169. See id. § 101 (defining literary works as "works, other than audiovisual works, ex-
pressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the
nature of the material objects... in which they are embodied"); see also Lothar Determann,
Basic CopyrightLaw and the Internet, 612 PLI/Pat 347,351 (2000) (stating that different works
on Internet can be copyrighted, such as "individual text, pictures, and graphics contained on a
website as literary.., works"); Ovanezian, supra note 2, at 275 ("Web sites often resemble the
pages of printed books or magazines. The copyrights in these magazine-like Web pages will
be very similar to traditional print media copyrights. In addition to protecting the literary work
appearing on these printed pages, the Copyright Act also protects the rights of authors in their
graphic works. As such, there is a copyright in all original text and images on Web sites.").
170. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining audiovisual works as "works that consist of a series of
related images which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines, or devices
such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if any,
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reports, and courts have stated that news reports are original works of author-
ship.
1 1
Second, informational web sites fall within the statutory language requir-
ing a copyrightable work to be "fixed in any tangible medium of expression,
now known or later developed, from which [it] can be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device.1 72 Congress's purpose was to include a wide variety of works within
this language.17 1 Consequently, Internet sites fall within this category. Also,
at least one scholar has stated that online works meet the fixation require-
ment.
174
Therefore, informational web sites fall within the subject matter of fed-
eral copyright law. As a result, the web site owners have the exclusive rights
to these web sites.17 The Copyright Act states that anyone who violates one
regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are
embodied"). Under this definition, aweb site can be considered a "series of related images" that
are "intended to be shown by the use of" computers, which can qualify as "machines." The
statutory language referring to "accompanying sounds" does not appear to be a requirement
because of the limiting language "if any." Also, at least one commentator has argued that web
sites are audiovisual works. See Determann, supra note 169, at 351 (arguing that copyright
protection can extend to "a website screen display as an audiovisual work").
171. See Wainwright See., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 95-96 (2d Cir.
1977) (ruling that defendant's use of plaintiff's reports was copyright infringement); Pao. & S.
Co. v. Duncan, 572 F. Supp. 1186, 1192 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (stating that it is "well-settled that
copyright protection does extend to the reports themselves"), affid in part, rev'd in part, 744
F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1984).
172. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
173. See H.R. REP. No. 89-22337, at 44 (1966) (explaining congressional intent concern-
ing fixation in medium requirement). The House Report provides:
[Ilt makes no difference what the form, matter, or medium of fixation may be -
whether it is in words, numbers, notes, sounds, pictures, or any other graphic or
symbolic indicia, whether embodied in a physical object in written, printed, photo-
graphic, sculptural, punched, magnetic, or any stable form, and whether it is capa-
ble of perception directly or by means of any machine or device "now known or
later developed."
Id.
174. See Determann, supra note 169, at 351 ("The fixation requirement does not seem to
be too problematic with respect to online works, as U.S. courts have long held that even
changing screen displays of computer games can be copyrightable.").
175. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (listing exclusive rights of copyright
holders). This section provides as follows:
[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to
authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
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of these exclusive rights is a copyright infiinger." 6 Therefore, anyone who
reproduces the web sites by copying or by distributing copies of the web sites
to others has infringed the web site owner's copyright." 7
B. Fair Use Defense to Copyright Infringement
The Copyright Act provides a broad defense to copyright infringement
known as the fair use doctrine, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107."8 According to
this section, the use of a copyrighted material "for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching,... scholarship, or research" does not con-
stitute copyright infringement." 9 The fair use doctrine is important because it
may provide a valid defense to a charge of copyright infringement on the
Intemet.
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly, and
(5) in the case ofliterary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a
motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly,
and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by
means of digital audio transmission.
Id.
176. See id. § 501 (1994) (providing that "[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner.., is an infringer of the copyright).
177. Id. § 106(1), (3).
178. 17 U.S.C. § 107 provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copy-
righted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by
any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, tesching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship,
or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use
made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall
include -
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a com-
mercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes,
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole, and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such
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For example, a teacher may choose to download and print multiple copies
of an article from the Washingtonpost.com for use in class. According to the
copyright notice on the Washingtonpost.com web site, this teacher would be
prohibited from doing so.'" However, § 107 of the Copyright Act specifically
states that the use of a copyrighted material for 't eaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use)" may constitute a fair use. 8' Under another hypo-
thetical situation, an Internet user might decide to copy an article from the
New York Times on the Web in order to use that article in a piece of scholar-
ship or research. According to the New York Times Copyright Notice, such
use would violate the user agreemnent.' However, § 107 provides a fair use
defense for research or scholarship purposes.s
These potential situations make further examination of the fair use doc-
trine necessary. When a party raises a fair use defense, courts usually analyze
the four factors provided by Congress to determine whether the doctrine ap-
plies to the defendant's use ofthe copyrighted work." 4 These four factors are
as follows:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3)theamountandsubstantialityoftheportionusedinrelationtothe copy-
righted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work. 18
Congress intended that these four factors be analyzed together and assessed
against one another. 8 " The purpose of the fair use doctrine is to "[permit]
180. See Washingtonpostcom Copyright Notice, available at http:/washingtonpost.com
(last visited Sept. 23,2001) (stipulating that user may only "make one machine readable copy and/
or one print copy that is limited to occasional articles of personal interest only") (emphasis added).
181. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (emphasis added).
182. See The New York Times Copyright Notice, available at http'/www.nytimes.com/
info/help/copyrighthtml (last visited Sept 19, 2001) (stating that "you may download material
from the New York Times on the Web (one machine readable copy and one print copy per page)
for your personal, noncommercial use only"). Use of the material for scholarship or research,
especially if the scholarship or research is published, probably would not qualiy as "personal,
noncommercial use." Therefore, the New York Times on the Web bars such use.
183. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
184. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,577-93 (1994) (describ-
ing and assessing four statutory factors of 17 U.S.C. § 107 in context of parody of copyrighted
song); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362,1366-67 (E.D. Va. 1995) (listing and
analyzing four factors court must consider "[iln deternining whether the use of a copyrighted
work is fair use"); Strauss v. Hearst Corp., 1988 WL 18932, at *3-*5 (SD.N.Y. 1988) (applying
four fair use factors to alleged copyright infringement).
185. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
186. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 ("Nor may the four statutory factors be treated in iso-
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courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion,
it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.""'
With these principles in mind, it is necessary to apply the four fair use factors
to the potential infringement of the web sites' copyrights.
1. Fair Use Factors: Purpose and Character of the Use of the Work
In applying the first factor, a court will look to the purpose and character
of the use ofthe work. 8  One scholar has stated that the most common fair use
purposes are listed in the preamble to § 107; s9 these purposes include criti-
cisn, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research."9° There-
fore, if an Internet user makes copies of a web site article for one of these
purposes, the fair use defense should apply. Also, the Supreme Court has held
that, in order for the fair use defense to apply, it is not necessary for the user of
the copyrighted work to make "productive" use ofthe work. 91 In other words,
the copier need not add his or her own contribution to the workthat is copied."9
The verbatim use of a copyrighted work, therefore, can still constitute fair
use. 9 This rule provides further support for the idea that an Internet user who
copies online information for one of the purposes listed in the preamble to
§ 107 is protected bythe fair use doctrine.
If the copyright infringer's purpose is to put the copyrighted material to
a commercial use, then courts are likely to find that such use is unfair. The
Supreme Court has stated that any commercial use of a copyrighted work is
presumptively unfair. The Court has subsequently attempted to distance
lation, one from another. All are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light bf
the purposes of copyright").
187. Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Co., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir.
1980).
188. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1994).
189. See 4 NnIMER ON COPYRwuHT, supra note 167, § 13.05[A][1][a] (stating that "the
preamble to Section 107 does enumerate certain purposes that are most appropriate for a finding
of fair use").
190. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
191. See Sony Corp. ofAm. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,455 n.40 (1984)
(explaining that Court of Appeals erred in its reasoning that use of copyrighted work must be
productive use in order to be fair use). The term "productive" use is synonymous with the term
"transformative" use.
192. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,579 (1994) (stating that trans-
formative use of copyrighted work "is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use").
193. See Sony Corp. ofAm., 464 U.S. at 455 n.40 (explaining that teacher who copies to
prepare lecture notes, teacher who copies for purpose of broadening own personal knowledge,
legislator who copies in order to better understand constituents, or hospital that copies television
programs for patients are all protected by fair use).
194. See id. at451 (asserting that "every commercialuse of copyrighted material is presump-
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itself from this hard presumption, reasoning that such a rule runs contrary to
congressional intent."9 Still, it is likely that "commerciality merely inclines
against fair use."'196 Therefore, if someone copies the online information for
commercial use, the fair use doctrine will probably not provide a defense."9
The question, of course, is how to determine whether a use is commercial
or non-commercial. The commercial versus non-commercial distinction exists
on a continuum because few uses of copyrighted material will fall directly into
one or the other category."' At one extreme on the continuum is educational
use by nonprofit institutions.1" Educational use favors a copyright defend-
ant.' ° At the other extreme is use to advertise or sell a product or service. °
Such use is clearly commercial.2' The uses that are of a more questionable
commercial character, and thus fall in the middle of the continuum, include
news reporting, criticism, research, and scholarship.2°s Use of informational
tively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copy-
right").
195. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584 ("Congress could not have intended such a rule."). In
Campbell, the Court held that a rap group's parody of the plaintiff's copyrighted song, despite
the fact that the parody was sold on an album for commercial gain, was fair use. Id. at 594.
196. NIMMEE. ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 167, § 13.05[A][1][c]; see also WILLAM F.
PATRY, THE FAIR UsE PRI aiLGE IN CoPYRIGnT LAW 432 (2d ed. 1995) (stating that "[tihe
character of a use as commercial will tend to weigh against the first factor being resolved in the
defendant's favor").
197. See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913,922 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating
that "[t]he greater the private economic rewards reaped by the secondary user (to the exclusion
of broader public benefits), the more likely the first factor will favor the copyright holder and
the less likely the use will be considered fair").
198. See Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1262 (2d Cir. 1986) ("The
commercial nature of a use is a matter of degree, not an absolute.").
199. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1354 (Ct CL 1973)
(emphasizing that defendants were nonprofit institutions dedicated to advancement of medical
knowledge and science and were not motivated by financial gain; thus, use was fair), affd by
an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975); PATRY, supra note 196, at 423 (explaining that
extreme on continuum that is most favorable to defendants consists of use for educational
purposes in nonprofit setting).
200. See PATRY, supra note 196, at 423 (stating that this situation is "the most favorable
for the defense").
201. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1558 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (ex-
plaining that defendant's posting of plaintiff's copyrighted photographs on defendant's com-
puter billboard, so that users could access for fee, was "clearly" commercial use).
202. See United TeL Co. of Missouri v. Johnson Publ'8 Co., 855 F.2d 604, 609-10 (8th
Cir. 1988) (finding that defendant's use of plaintiff's telephone listings was commercial because
defendant intended to increase product sales from such use).
203. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (stating that fair use may include use "for purposes such as criti-
cism, comment, news reporting,... scholarship, or research"); PATRY, supra note 196, at 424-
25 (stating that intermediate uses include "many of the uses listed as examples in the preamble
to Section 107").
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web sites could fall under one ofthese categories. For example, a scholar may
use online news articles in order to gather information for a research project
and might copy portions of these articles for use in the project. Similarly, a
news commentator may use an opinion editorial contained on one of these
sites inthe user's own critical commentary. These types of uses have a slight-
ly commercial character because the research project may become part of a
published scholarly journal, and the critical commentary may be published in
a newspaper or other periodical for sale.
However, other considerations, particularly the public benefit resulting
from the use, should outweigh the commercial character of these uses. For
example, in the case of a use for serious scholarship, 'the fact that [the second
work] is sold for money has often been eclipsed in evaluating the first [fair
use] factor.'"2°0 Ifthe infringing work was created primarily in order to benefit
the public, then a court may consider this fact in addition to any co-existing
commercial motive. °s Often, the public benefit motivation will outweigh the
commercial motivation. °' By permitting a fair use defense in this situation,
courts further the goals of copyright law." 7
Therefore, if an Internet user copies or uses information provided by a
web site for a purpose such as education, scholarship or research, the first
factor of the fair use doctrine will likely protect that user. However, if the
user has a purely commercial motive, the fair use doctrine will not apply.
Assuming that the character of the use is permissible, it is necessary to exam-
ine the other three statutory factors.
2. Fair Use Factors: Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The second statutory factor is "the nature of the copyrighted work."'2'e
The key distinction under this factor is whether the copyrighted work qualifies
204. PATRY, supra note 196, at 426.
205. See MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180,182 (2d Cir. 1981) (explaining that, "[w]hile
commercial motivation and fair use can exist side by side, the court may consider whether the
alleged infringing use was primarily for public benefit or for private commercial gain").
206. See Arica Inst, Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067,1078 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that defen-
dant's motive was "to further develop our store of knowledge" in psychology, and that this motive
was "not offset by [defendant's] concurrent commercial purpose"); Wright v. Warner Books, Inc.,
953 F.2d 731, 736-37 (2d Cir. 1991) (explaining that if defendant's use is for scholarship or
research, analysis of first fair use factor should end, even if defendant anticipates profits).
207. See Wright, 953 F.2d at 736 (asserting that analytic research "further[ed] the goals of
the copyright laws by adding value to prior intellectual labor"); Robinson v. Random House,
Inc., 877 F. Supp. 830, 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating that fair use doctrine "recognizes that there
are circumstances in which the Copyright Act's goals of encouraging creative and original work
is better served by allowing a use of copyrighted work than prohibiting such use").
208. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1994).
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as an informational work or an entertainment work.2' Courts have stated that
use of informational or factual works is more likely to be protected by the fair
use doctrine.21° In particular, news reports are less protected than other, more
creative, works."' Therefore, the second factor weighs in favor of a finding
of fair use in the case of informational web sites.
3. Fair Use Factors: Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used in
Relation to the Copyrighted Work as a Whole
The third fair use factor requires courts to examine '"te amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole.i212 Under this factor, it is first necessary to determine what precisely
the "work" is. Most cases hold that each article in a journal is a separate,
copyrighted work.21  Other cases, however, have held that the magazine or
journal itself, and not each component ofthe magazine or journal, is the entire
work.214 Under the first approach, which is arguably the more popular of the
two,21 each article on an informational web site would constitute an entire
work
The entire work distinction is important because courts usually deny fair
use for the copying of entire works or substantial portions of those works. 6
However, there is an important exception to this general rule. Congress
established guidelines permitting a teacher to make a complete copy of a
209. See PATRY, supra note 196, at 505 ("An oft-cited approach to the factor distinguishes
between 'informational' and 'entertainment' works, i.e., factual and nonfactual works.").
210. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207,237 (1990) (explaining that "fair use is more
likely to be found in factual works than fictional works"); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985) (stating that "[tlhe law generally recognizes a greater
need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy").
211. See Sony Corp. ofAm. v. Universal City Studios, Ine., 464 U.S. 417,496.97 (1984)
(explaining that "informational works, such as news reports, that readily lend themselves to
productive use by others, are less protected than creative works of entertainment").
212. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3).
213. See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913,926 (2d Cir. 1994) (con-
eluding that each article in scholarly journal, not journal as a whole, constituted entire work);
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345,1353 (Ct. CI. 1973) (implicitly recog-
nizing that each article injournal represented an entire work).
214. See Triangle Publ'ns, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1177
n.15 (5th Cir. 1980) (explaining that use of cover of copyrighted magazine alone is not use of
entire work).
215. See PATRY, supra note 196, at 551-52 (asserting that conclusion that journal or
magazine is entire work is erroneous).
216. See Marcus v.Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171,1176 (9th Cir. 1983) (statingthat "this court
has long maintained the view that wholesale copying of copyrighted material precludes
application of the fair use doctrine").
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work for research or teaching purposes."' Under these guidelines, a teacher
217. H.IL REP. No. 94-1476, at 68-69 (1976). This provides as follows:
OUIDELINES
L Single Copying for Teachers
A single copy may be made of any of the following by or for a teacher at his or her
individual request for his or her scholarly research or use in teaching or preparation
to teach a class:
A. A chapter from a book;
B. An article from a periodical or newspaper,
C. A short story, short essay or short poem, whether or not from a collective work;
D. A chart, graph, diagram, drawing, cartoon or picture from a book, periodical,
or newspaper,
IL Multiple Copies for Classroom Use
Multiple copies (not to exceed in any event more than one copy per pupil in a
course) may be made by or for the teacher giving the course for classroom use or
discussion; provided that
A. The copying meets the tests of brevity and spontaneity as defined below, and,
B. Meets the cumulative effect test as defined below, and,
C. Each copy includes a notice of copyright
Definitions
Brevity
(i) Poetry. (a) A complete poem if less than 250 words and if printed on not
more than two pages or, (b) from a longer poem, an excerpt of not more than
250 words.
(ii) Prose: (a) Either a complete article, story or essay of less than 2,500 words,
or (b) an excerpt from any prose work of not more than 1,000 words or 10%
of the work, whichever is less, but in any event a minimum of 500 words.
[Each of the numerical limits stated in "i" and "ii" above may be expanded to per-
mit the completion of an unfinished line of a poem or of an unfinished prose para-
graph.]
(ill) Illustration: One chart, graph, diagram, drawing, cartoon or picture per book
or per periodical issue.
(iv) "Special" works: Certain works in poetry, prose or in "poetic prose" which
often combine language with illustrations and which are intended sometimes
for children and at other times for a more general audience fall short of 2,500
words in their entirety. Paragraph "ii" above notwithstanding such "special
works" may not be reproduced in their entirety, however, an excerpt compris-
ing not more than two of the published pages of such special work and
containing not more than 10% of the words found in the text thereof, may be
reproduced.
Spontaneity
(i) The copying is at the instance and inspiration of the individual teacher, and
(ii) The inspiration and decision to use the work and the moment of its use for
maximum teaching effectiveness are so close in time that it would be unrea-
sonable to expect a timely reply to a request for permission.
Cumulative Effect
(i) The copying of the material is for only one course in the school in which the
copies are made.
(ii) Not more than one short poem, article, story, essay or two excerpts may be
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can copy an article from a periodical or newspaper for scholarly research,
teaching, or preparation for teaching.21 Also, a teacher can make multiple
copies - one for each student - of an article for classroom use so long as such
copying meets the congressional definitions of brevity, spontaneity, and
cumulative effect.219 The standard for brevity stipulates that a teacher may
copy a complete article of less than 2,000 words, or an excerpt of an article
of not more than 1,000 words or 10 percent of the entire article.' 0 The
definition of spontaneity provides that the copying must be "at the instance
and inspiration of the individual teacher," and that the moment of the decision
to use the work and the moment of the actual use of the work must be so
close in time that to expect a reply to a request for permission would be
unreasonable. 1 Finally, the cumulative effect requirement provides that, in
the case of the copying of a news article, such copying is for use in only one
course in the school.'
Therefore, assuming that a teacher's copying of entire Internet articles
fits within the tests of brevity, spontaneity, and cumulative effect, such copy-
ing should not fail under the third fair use factor. For non-teachers, the copy-
ing of an entire Internet article would militate against a finding of fair use.'
But the use of an entire article may be outweighed by the other factors.
4. Fair Use Factors: Effect of Use upon the Potential Market or Value of
the Copyrighted Work
The fourth fair use factor directs courts to analyze 'the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value ofthe copyrighted work." 4 This factor
directs courts to examine the market harmto the copyright holder caused by the
copied from the same author, nor more than three from the same collective
work or periodical volume during one class term.
(iii) -There shall not be more than nine instances of such multiple copying for one
course during one class term.
[The limitations stated in "ii" and "iii" above shall not apply to current news per-







223. See supra note 216 and accompanying text (discussing common rule that copying of
entire work suggests that use was not fair). Of course, the web site agreements permit a user to
print out one entire copy of an article for personal use only. See supra notes 11-13 and ac-
companying text (discussing web site provisions).
224. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1994).
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actions ofthe copyright infringer.' The fourth factor also includes an analysis
of whether the defendant's actions, if widespread enough, would cause eco-
nomic harm to the copyright holder.2 6 One court has stated that this "factor is
aimed at the copier who attempts to usurp the demand for the original work. "'
Following these principles, it would appear that an Internet user who
copies an online article for noncommercial purposes such as research, teaching,
or scholarship is not interfering with the market for the web site owner's
copyrighted material. The web sites presumably make money by charging
companies to advertise on their sites. By copying an article for research pur-
poses, the Internet user is not affecting the ability ofthe copyright holder to use
its copyrighted material to charge advertising fees. This result should not differ
no matter how widespread the copying for research or scholarship purposes.
However, the fourth factor also directs courts to examine the effect ofthe
infringement on the potential market for the copyrighted work.' This factor
can be construed very broadly if a court assumes that any use of a copyrighted
work is an intrusion into a potential market for the copyright owner.' In
other words, the use of an Internet article for scholarly purposes could have
an adverse effect on a potential market of the copyright holder if the web site
owner ever chooses to use the article for the same scholarly purpose. Of
course, in reality this is unlikely because the web sites are simply in the bus-
iness of providing information to the public. Therefore, courts generally
define the potential market for the use more narrowly as the market "that
creators of original works would in general develop or license others to
develop."' Under this definition, use of an Internet article for research or
scholarship will not fail under the fourth factor unless the web site owner
contemplates developing the same research or scholarship or licensing a third
party to use its copyrighted material for that research or scholarship. Thus, in
225. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569,590 (1994) (explaining that fourth
factor requires courts to analyze "the extent of the market harm caused by the particular actions
of the alleged infringer").
226. See NIMMERONCoPmaYPGTsupra note 167, § 13.05[A][4] (stating that courts should
consider "whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defend-
ant... would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market" for copyrighted
work).
227. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1050
(2d Cir. 1983).
228. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (emphasis added).
229. See PATRY, supra note 196, at 557 ("If taken to a logical extreme, the fourth factor
would always weigh against fair use since there is always a potential market that the copyright
owner could in theory license.").
230. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592; see also PATRY, supra note 196, at 558 (stating that term
"potential" should refer to "not only uses currently being exploited, but also uses that the copy-
right owner might have an interest in exploiting in the future").
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the context of noncommercial purposes such as research, teaching, or scholar-
ship, the use of the online information will not have an adverse effect on the
"potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.""
C. Fair Use as a Defense to Infringement on the Web
The fair use doctrine will provide a defense to many uses of the copy-
righted material on informational web sites. 2 Although some uses may be
deemed partly commercial, and some users may copy an entire article, the four
fair use factors, when analyzed together, demonstrate that the doctrine will
provide a valid defense for most noncommercial uses.' However, the web
site user agreements, if valid contracts, prohibit such uses.' Therefore, it is
necessary to turn to a discussion of the conflict between the state law contract
provisions and federal copyright law.
IV Federal Preemption ofState Law Contract Claims
The Copyright Act contains a preemption section providing that state law
causes of action may be preempted by a cause of action under the federal
act.' In order for a state law cause of action to be preempted, it must meet
two requirements. First, preemption occurs only if the state law creates a right
that is "equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright."2' Second, the state law right must "come within the subject
matter of copyright."' " A state law claim is not preempted only if it "contains
at least one element that makes it qualitatively different from a claim of
copyright infringement.
m8
231. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
232. See supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text (discussing possible uses that are
potentially protected by fair use doctrine but prohibited by web site copyright restrictions).
233. See supra notes 188-231 and accompanying text (discussing fair use factors).
234. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (discussing web site copyright provi-
sions).
235. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (providing for preemption of state law). This section provides
as follows:
[All legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of
authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the
subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103 ... are governed
exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equiv-
alent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State.
236. It
237. ML
238. Frontline Test Equip., Inc. v. GreenleafSoflware, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 583, 592 (W.D.
Va. 1998).
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Therefore, the question is whether a claim of breach of an Internet con-
tract is equivalent to a right under copyright law and comes within the subject
matter of copyright law, or if such claim contains an element that makes it
qualitatively different from a claim of copyright infringement. 219 Many courts
have analyzed this preemption issue and reached different conclusions.240
However, despite the disagreement among courts, a court should find that in
the case of a breach of the copyright provisions of an Internet contract, federal
copyright law preempts the state law claim.
First, it may be argued that the history of the preemption section itself
suggests that Congress intended for the Copyright Act to preempt state law
breaches of contract. A proposed preemption section provided that the
Copyright Act did not limit "any rights or remedies under the law of any State
with respect to... activities violating rights that are not equivalent to any of
the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by
section 106, including breaches of contract. ,,24 Thus, this statute specifi-
cally excluded breaches of contract from the class of preempted rights. How-
ever, the current § 301 deleted any mention of breach of contract claims.242
The fact that Congress originally felt that contract rights were not equivalent
to copyrights, but subsequently omitted the reference to breach of contract
claims, can be used to argue that Congress intended for § 301 to preempt a
contract claim. At least one court has relied on this congressional history in
reaching this conclusion.243 However, others have disagreed with this conclu-
sion.24
The disagreement over the inference to be drawn from the legislative
history is irrelevant because that history is not necessary in concluding that
federal copyright law preempts the rights created by online agreements. This
conclusion is warranted because the rights granted to the web site owners
under the online user agreements are equivalent to rights within the general
scope of copyright24 Courts have stated that a contract right is equivalent to
239. See supra notes 236-38 and accompanying text (discussing standards for preemption
of state claim).
240. See infra notes 251-303 and accompanying text (discussing preemption cases).
241. HR. 4347,89th Cong. § 301(bX3) (1966).
242. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (omitting any mention breach of contract claims).
243. See Wolff v. Inst. of Elec. & Elecs. Eng'rs, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 66,69 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
("Where Congress includes limiting language in an earlier version of a bill, but deletes it prior
to enactment, it may be presumed that the limitation was not intended." (quoting Russelio v.
United States, 464 U.S. 16,23-24 (1983))).
244. SeeArchitectronics, Inc. v. Control Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 425,440 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(reasoning that "Wolff rests almost entirely on what [this court] believe[s] are mistaken infer-
ences from the legislative history of § 301"); see also NMMER ON COPYRIG=r, supra note 167,
§ 1.01 [B][1][a] (arguing that Wo/ffcourt's "logic is faulty").
245. 17 U.S.C. § 301.
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copyright ifthe act of reproduction, distribution, or display infringes the con-
tract right a6 because these acts are among the exclusive rights granted to the
copyright owner.247 In other words, "if under state law the act of reproduction,
performance, distribution, or display... will in itself infringe the state-created
right, then such right is pre-empted."'24
Under the state law online user agreements, the act of reproduction (if
such reproduction is for other than personal interest) or distribution (as in the
case of a teacher who distributes articles to her students) will violate the
agreements because copying of the online materials is limited to personal and
noncommercial use. 49 Nothing more than reproduction or distribution is
required in order to violate these agreements. A breach of the online agree-
ment does not contain an element that makes it qualitatively different from a
claim of copyright infringement. 50 For example, if a user copies an online
article for scholarship use and subsequent distribution to publishers of schol-
arly journals, that user has violated the online agreement. However, the copy-
ing is also a copyright infringement, subject, of course, to a fair use defense.
Therefore, the federal copyright law will preempt the state law contract claim.
246. See Computer Assocs. Int', Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F2d 693, 716 (2d Cir. 1992)
("Section 106, in turn, affords a copyright owner the exclusive right to: (1) reproduce the copy-
righted work; (2) prepare derivative works; (3) otherwise; and, with respect to certain artistic
works, (4) perform the work publicly, and (5) display the work publicly. Section 301 thus
preempts only those state law rights that may be abridged by an act which, in and of itself,
would infringe one of the exclusive rights provided by federal copyright law.") (internal
citations and quotations omitted); see Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488,
1501 (5th Cir. 1990) (explaining that "right is equivalent if the mere act of reproduction,
distribution, or display infringes it"); Am. Movie Classics Co. v. Turner Entm't Co., 922 F.
Supp. 926, 931 (SD.N.Y. 1996) (explaining that "breach of contract claim is preempted if it
is merely based on allegations that the defendant did something that the copyright laws reserve
exclusively to the plaintiff (such as unauthorized reproduction, performance, distribution, or
display)"), Wolff, 768 F. Supp. at 69 (finding that, because defendant had both breached
contract and infringed plaintiff's copyright through unauthorized reproduction of plaintiff's
photograph, breach of contract claim was preempted); see also Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630,
635 (9th Cir. 1984) (asserting that preemption of state right occurs only "if that right may be
abridged by an act which, in and of itself, would infringe one of the exclusive rights listed in
§ 106") (internal quotations omitted).
247. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (providing that owner of copyright hasexclusive rights to "repro-
duce," "prepare derivative copies," "distribute copies" and "perform the copyrighted work pub-
licly").
248. NIMMERONCOPYRIGHT, supra note 167, § 1.01[VB][1].
249. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (discussing restrictive copyright pro-
visions on web sites).
250. See Frontline Test Equip., Inc. v. Greenleaf Software, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 583, 592
(WD. Va. 1998) (explaining that, in order for state law claim to avoid preemption, that claim
must "[contain] at least one element that makes it qualitatively different from a claim of copy-
right infringement").
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A. Cases in Which Federal Law Preempted State Law
The cases in which courts have found preemption are all factually similar
to the above scenario. For example, in Wolff v. Institute of Electrical &
Electronics Engineers, Inc., 1 the Southern District of New York held that
federal copyright law preempted the plaintiff's breach of contract claim.2 2 In
Wolff, the plaintiff granted the defendant a right to a one time use of the
plaintiff's photograph in defendant's magazine. 3 However, the defendant
used a reproduction of the photograph in subsequent advertisements without
the plaintiff's permission, and the plaintiff sued, claiming both copyright
infringement and breach of contract.254 The defendant then argued that the
breach of contract claim was preempted by federal law.25' The court ex-
plained that the contract right was not qualitatively different from the right
granted under the Copyright Act.2 6 The defendant breached the contract by
nfingng on the plaintiff's copyright; thus, the court found that the contract
claim was preempted. 7
In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises," the court
ruled that the plaintiffs' claims of conversion and interference with contract
were preempted by federal copyright law. 9 In Harper & Row, the plaintiffs
251. 768 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
252. Wolff v. Inst. of Ele. & Elecs. Eng'rs, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 66, 69 (SD.N.Y. 1991)
(finding that state law breach of contract claim was preempted by Copyright Act). In Wolff, the
defendant breached its contract with the plaintiff by using the plaintiff's photograph in an
unauthorized manner. Id at 67. The court did not engage in an exhaustive analysis of preemp-
tion law, but did state the general principle that state claims ame equivalent to rights under the
Copyright Act unless the state claim is "qualitatively different" from the rights granted by
federal law. Id. at 69. The court also relied on the fact that Congress had originally created a
safe harbor provision for breach of contract claims, but had then removed that provision. Id.
The court stated that "[w]here Congress includes limiting language in an earlier version of a bill,
but deletes it prior to enactment, it may be presumed that the limitation was not intended." Id.
(quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16,23-24 (1983)). Therefore, the court found that
federal law preempted the breach of contract claim. Id.
253. Id. at 67.
254. Id.
255. Id. at69.
256. See id. (finding that defendant breached contract by infringing plaintiff's copyright;
therefore, it was "difficult to see how the resulting claims are qualitatively different").
257. See id. ("Accordingly, the breach of contract claim is preempted.").
258. 501 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'don other
grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
259. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 501 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(finding that state law claims were preempted), aff'd, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd on
other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985). In Harper & Row, the plaintiffs alleged state claims of
conversion and interference with contract after the defendant published excerpts of Gerald
Ford's memoirs without permission. Id at 849-50. The court stated that preempted state claims
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obtained permission from Gerald Ford to publish his memoirs.2"e The plain-
tiffs then entered into a contract with Time, Inc. in which they agreed to allow
Time to publish excerpts of the memoirs in an issue of its magazine.26' How-
ever, the defendant somehow obtained the memoirs and published them
without the plaintiff's permission.262 The plaintiffs alleged conversion and
interference with their contract with Time.263 The court explained that the
essence of the conversion claim was the defendant's act of copying portions
of the memoirs.26 Under this claim, the court explained that "plaintiffs seek
to vindicate rights which are equivalent to the rights protected under the copy-
right laws, i.e., the exclusive right to reproduce and distribute a copyrightable
work." '  Therefore, federal law preempted the conversion claim.26' Next, in
analyzing the plaintiffs' interference with contract claim, the court explained
that the rights the plaintiffs sought to have protected were analogous to the
rights of copyright holders because they were the rights to prepare derivative
works and to distribute copies of the copyrighted work.267  Therefore, this
claim was also preempted.2"
In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. T-Shirt Gallery, Ltd.,269 the court found
that the Copyright Act preempted the plaintiffs' state law claim of 'unfair
competition.20 In Universal City, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant vio-
are those that invoke rights that are equivalent to the rights under the scope of copyright; these
include the right to exclusive reproduction, performance, distribution, or display. Id. at 852.
In this case, the plaintiff's state claims sought to vindicate these exclusive rights because the
claims alleged that the defendant had reproduced and distributed the plaintiffs copyrighted
work. Id. at 852-53. Therefore, federal copyright law preempted these state claims. Id.
260. Id. at 849.
261. Id.
262. Id
263. Id. at 850.
264. See id. at 852 ("The essence of plaintiffs' conversion claim ... is that defendants




267. See id. at 853 (explaining that contractual right sought to be protected was "closely
analogous" to exclusive rights of copyright holders).
268. Id. at 854.
269. 634 F. Supp. 1468 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
270. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. T-Shirt Gallery, Ltd., 634 F. Supp. 1468 (S.DN.Y.
1986) (ruling that Copyright Act preempted state claim of unfair competition). In Universal
City, the defendants created t-shirts featuring mouse characters called "Miami Mice." Id. at
1473. -The t-shirt characters bore a striking resemblance to the two main characters on the
plaintiff's copyrighted television show "Miami Vice." Id. Universal City sued on a state law
claim of unfair competition. Id. at 1474. The court, however, ruled that the state claim con-
sisted merely of the misappropriation and reproduction of the plaintiff's copyrighted characters
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lated the state unfair competition law by reproducing and depicting the plain-
tiff's television show characters on t-shirts" However, the court stated that
the right that the plaintiff sought to have protected was equivalent to a right
under copyright law.272 The court ruled that ' t he unfair competition com-
plained of here consists simply of the misappropriation and reproduction of
the style and characters of plaintiffs' television series into t-shirt form;" there-
fore, federal law preempted the claimY3
These cases all involve situations in which the defendant simply repro-
duced or distributed the plaintiff's copyrighted work and the plaintiff sued to
enforce its rights under state law. These situations are factually similar to a
situation in which an Internet user simply copies or reproduces portions of the
copyrighted web site, and the web site owner subsequently sues to enforce the
state law user agreement. Therefore, a court should hold that the user agree-
ments, and the restrictive copyright provisions contained therein, are pre-
empted by the Copyright Act.
B. Cases in Which Federal Law Did Not Preempt State Law
The cases in which courts have ruled that the federal act does not pre-
empt a state claim are all distinguishable from the situation of an online user
agreement because each contains some qualitatively different element. For
example, in Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 4 federal law did not preempt
the plaintiff's breach of contract claim because it did not arise out of the
subject matter of copyright law.2" In Acorn, the plaintiff architectural com-
pany provided design drawings to the defendant, a prospective customer.26
The Fourth Circuit explained that implicit in the contract was an agreement
and was therefore preempted by the Copyright Act Id. at 1475. The plaintiffs argued that their
state claim contained the additional element of commercial immorality. Id. However, the court
explained that the mere allegation of unfairness or immorality is insufficient to render a state
claim qualitatively different from a federal copyright claim. Id. at 1476. "The use of [the com-
mercial immorality] label in no way detracts from the fact that the misappropriation claim seeks
to protect the same rights which the federal copyright laws are designed to protect" Id.
271. Id. at 1473.
272. Id. at 1475.
273. Id.
274. 846 F.2d 923 (4th Cir. 1988).
275. Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding that breach
of contract claim did not arise out of same right as copyright and, thus, was not preempted).
The court relied on an implicit agreement within the parties' contract that, if the defendant used
the plaintiff's design plans, he would either purchase those plans or building materials from the
plaintiff. Id. at 926. This implicit agreement did not arise out of one of the rights under copy-
right law, that is, copyright law alone would not protect the plaintiff's right to have this agree-
ment enforced. Id. Therefore, copyright law did not preempt the breach of contract claim. Id.
276. Id. at 924.
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that, if the defendant used the design plans, he would either buy the plans
from the plaintiff or buy building materials from the plaintiff." However, the
defendant hired another architect who used the plaintiff's plansY The court
found that the plaintiff's resulting breach of contract claim was not preempted
because the claim arose out of the implicit agreement that if the defendant
used the plans, he would either buy them or buy building materials from the
plaintiff. "  The delivery of the plans to the third party architect did not
infringe upon a right equivalent to that granted by federal law because it did
not arise out of the subject matter of copyright.280 Thus, the state law claim
was not preempted.2a Presumably, however, if the defendant had merely
copied and distributed the plans for his own commercial gain, the Copyright
Act would have preempted any state law cause of action.
Similarly, in National Car Rental System, Inc. v. Computer Associates
International, Inc. ,'2 the Eighth Circuit found that federal copyright law did
not preempt the plaintiff's breach of contract claim because federal law alone
did not grant the plaintiff the right it was seeking to enforce.2 3 In National,
Computer Associates (CA) licensed its software to National in order for
National to process its own data.2" However, National used the software to
process third party data." In the ensuing breach of contract claim by CA, the
court explained that "CA does not claim that National is doing something that
the copyright laws reserve exclusively to the copyright holder, or that the use
restriction is breached 'bythe mere act ofreproduction, performance, distribu-
tion or display."''' 6 The prohibited act was the processing of data for third
parties, and the Copyright Act does not prohibit that act by its own force.2 7
277. IM at 926.
278. Id. at 925.
279. See id. at 926 ("Acorn's cause of action is based upon this implicit provision of the
contract which does not arise out of the subject matter of copyright and is therefore a separate
and distinct cause of action.").
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. 991 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1993).
283. National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426 (8th Cir.
1993) (finding breach of contract claim not preempted because it was different from copyright
claim). In National, the key factor was that the contract created a right beyond those rights
protected by the Copyright Act. Id. at 433. The contract prohibited National's processing of
data for third parties. Id. at 428. The Copyright Act, on the other hand, protects only the rights
of "reproduction, performance, distribution or display." Id at 431. Therefore, the court
concluded that federal law did not preempt the breach of contract claim. Id. at 435.
284. IM at427-28.
285. Id. at 428.
286. Id. at433.
287. See id. (explaining that no exclusive right under copyright law granted CA right it
sought to enforce under parties' contract).
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Because CA's claim arose from the parties' agreement and would not have
existed under federal law alone, that claim was not preempted.' Therefore,
National is also distinguishable from a case in which the defendant merely
commits one of the acts described in 17 U.S.C. § 106.
Next, in Frontline Test Equipment, Inc. v. Greenleaf Software, Inc.," 9 a
federal district court found that federal law did not preempt a breach of con-
tract claim alleging decompilation ofthe plaintiff's computer program. The
plaintiff had licensed its software to the defendant, subject to a contract
prohibiting decompilation of the software." I When the defendant allegedly
decompiled the software program, the plaintiff sued, claiming breach of
contract.? The court adopted the views of Professors Melville Nimmer and
David Nimmer that "'preemption should continue to strike down claims that,
though denominated contract, nonetheless complain directly about the repro-
duction of excessive materials.' 3 Here, the complaint alleged a qualitatively
different element than mere reproduction; it alleged the breach of contract
claim of decompilation.' The court explained that federal copyright law
does not proscribe decompilation."5 Therefore, federal law did not preempt
the breach of contract claim.7
The most significant preemption case is ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg.'
ProCD is important because it addressed the validity of a shrinkwrap contract
and federal preemption of the terms of that contract.' The Seventh Circuit
held that the shrinkwrap contract was enforceable and, further, that federal
law did not preempt the resulting breach of contract claim.' The court
288. See id. ("Absent the parties' agreement, the restriction would not exist").
289. 10 F. Supp. 2d 583 (W.D. Va. 1998).
290. Frontline Test Equip., Inc. v. Greenleaf Software, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 583 (W.D. Va.
1998) (finding that breach of contract claim alleging decompilation of plaintiff's software was
qualitatively different from copyright claim). In Frondine, the plaintiff alleged that the defend-
ant had breached the contract by decompiling the plaintiff's software. Id. at 587. The defendant
argued that this claim was preempted by federal law. Id. However, the court explained that
"[d]ecompilation is not forbidden by federal copyright law." Id. at 593. The court relied on the
exclusive rights listed in 17 U.S.C. § 106 to reach this conclusion. Id. Because the act of
decompilation was forbidden only by the parties' contract, the court found that the breach of
contract claim was not preempted. Id.
291. Id. at 585-86.
292. Id. at 586-87.
293. Id. at 593 (quotingNIMMER ONCOPYRIGr, supra note 167, § 1.01[B][1][a]).
294. See id. (explaining that plaintiff complained of action that violated contact, but did
not violate copyright law).
295. See id. ("Decompilation is not forbidden by federal copyright law.").
296. Id.
297. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
298. See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text (discussing ProCD).
299. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1455.
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reasoned that, because of the different nature of the rights, contract rights are
not equivalent to rights granted under federal copyright law.3° Copyright is
enforceable against the whole world, whereas contractual rights are enforce-
able only against the parties involved.30' The defendant in ProCD breached
the contract by putting the plaintiff's software to his own commercial use.
°2
The court therefore enforced the contract because of the difference between
the rights under the contract and the rights under copyright law. 3
ProCD, however, is not as damaging as it might first appear to the idea
that an online user agreement is preempted by federal copyright law. First; the
Seventh Circuit admitted that it thought "it prudent to refrain from adopting
a rule that anything with the label 'contract' is necessarily outside the preemp-




Relying on National Car, the court recognized that the Copyright Act may
preempt some rights under contract law.305 Also, ProCD involved a situation
in which the defendant did more than merely reproduce or distribute the
plaintiff's work; he used the plaintiffs work to set up a competing business
and to sell the plaintiff's product at a lower price.31 This situation - which
would clearly be unprotected by the fair use defense - is easily distinguishable
from a situation in which an Internet user simply makes copies of a web site
article to distribute to students, to use for scholarly research, or even to use to
write a critical opinion article. As in Acorn, National Car, and Frontline, the
state law claim in ProCD was not preempted because it involved more than
simply infringing on a copyright holder's right under 17 U.S.C. § 106 .3° The
fact that ProCD involved a shrinkwrap contract is also not dispositive; as
discussed above, shrinkwrap contracts are distinguishable from the contracts
that might be created by online user agreements." Also, the ProCD court
stated that preemption is not warranted for "khrinkwrap licenses of the kind
before us," thus indicating that preemption of other kinds of shrinkwrap
contracts might be warrnted.3°
300. IM at 1454.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 1450.
303. Id at 1455.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 1450.
307. See supra notes274-96 and accompanying text (discussingAcom, National Car, and
Frontline cases).
308. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text (discussing differences between
shrinkwrap contracts and online user agreements).
309. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1455.
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C. Federal Copyright Law Will Preempt the State Law
Online User Agreements
In conclusion, all of the cases finding that federal law did not preempt
state law claims contain a qualitative element in additionto mere reproduction
or the like. This fact distinguishes these cases from the issue of preemption
of an online user agreement. The Wolff, Harper & Row, and Universal City
cases are more analogous to a case in which an online user copies Internet
articles for certain fair uses. ° Therefore, a court should hold that the restric-
tive copyright provisions contained within the web site user agreements are
preempted by § 301 ofthe Copyright Act.
V Tying It All Together
The several legal issues presented by the user agreements of informa-
tional web sites are so interrelated that any court addressing the enforceability
of these agreements must eventually analyze each of these issues. This Note
has addressed each of these issues in turn and in the order in which a court
should address them. The inevitable conclusion is that the restrictive copy-
right notices in these web sites are unenforceable.
Under an analysis of contract law, the first question is whether these
online agreements, and the copyright provisions contained therein, satisfy the
requirement of mutual assent, and, to a lesser degree, the requirement of an
exchange of consideration."1 The relatively hidden nature of the agreements
suggests that these contractual requirements are missing."' Although the
trend toward enforceability of clickwrap and shrinkwrap contracts suggests
that courts are willing to find a valid contract under non-traditional factual
scenarios,, these classes of cases are distinguishable from the factual sce-
nario of an online user agreement on an informational web site.3" 4 Further-
more, although browsewrap contracts are more akin to online user agreements,
the two courts that have addressed browsewrap contracts have reached oppo-
site conclusions regarding their enforceability." Thus, it is very possible that
informational web site user agreements are unenforceable.
310. See supra notes 251-73 and accompanying text (discussing this trio of cases and their
similarity to copying of informational web site).
311. See supra Part HA (discussing traditional contractual requirements in context of
Internet agreements).
312. See supra Part IIA (explaining that online user agreements may not satisfy mutual
assent).
313. See supra Part IB (discussing clickwrap and shrinkwrap cases and effect on contract
law).
314. See supra Parts LB & I.C (discussing distinguishability of these cases from online
user agreements).
315. See supra notes 110-29 and accompanying text (discussing browsewrap cases).
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Even if the online agreements and their copyright provisions are valid
under state contractual law, these provisions meet a more damaging legal
hurdle under the federal Copyright Act. The restrictive copyright provisions
conflict with the affirmative defense provided by the fair use doctrine.316
Under the fair use doctrine, several noncommercial uses - such as teaching,
scholarship, critical commentary, and research - of the information on these
web sites are permissible. 1 However, the terms of the web site user agree-
ments facially bar such uses." 8 Thus, federal law and the online provisions
are in conflict. This conflict is one that the state law user agreements cannot
win. Under § 301 ofthe Copyright Act, federal law preempts state law causes
of action when the state law claims fall within the subject matter of copyright
and invoke rights equivalent to those granted by the Copyright Act.319 In this
situation, the rights invoked by the online user agreements fall squarely within
the subject matter of copyright and are equivalent. 20 There is no qualitative
difference between a copyright infringement action concerning use of the web
site material and a breach of contract claim under the user agreements.321
Therefore, such a breach of contract claim is preempted. Because any suit
will then fall entirely under federal copyright law, the fair use doctrine will
provide a defense for the various uses described in this Note. In the end,
teachers, researchers, scholars, and other fair users of the Internet material
have nothing to fear from the seemingly restrictive copyright terms of these
web sites.
316. See supra Part I.B (discussing fair use defense to copyright infingement).
317. See supra Part M213 (explaining that certain uses of web site material may be fair).
318. See supra Part IA (describing restrictive copyright provisions of web sites).
319. See supra Part IV (discussing federal preemption of state law).
320. See supra Part V.C (concluding that state law rights under online user agreements
are preempted).
321. See supra Part IV (discussing requirement of additional qualitative element of state
law claim to avoid preemption and failure of breach of contract claims under user agreements
to meet this requirement).
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